The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 75
Shortly after midnight on November 11, Washington began to realize the magnitude of the disaster MacArthur had inflicted on American troops.A telegram from the Far East Command stated that the Korean Second Army had collapsed and that the Eighth Army would soon be forced to withdraw across the Qingchuan River.The telegram arrived at the Pentagon's telecommunications center just before 28 a.m. Washington time.Four hours later, MacArthur acknowledged the failure of the offensive in a telegram, but excused himself for the failure in his usual fashion:
The developments resulting from our offensive operations are now clearly on display.Hopes to limit the Korean conflict to an enemy force consisting of North Korean troops and token outsiders can now be put to rest.China has invested a large amount of military power in North Korea, and its strength is still growing.Any pretense of small-scale support under the guise of volunteerism or other ploys now has not the slightest validity.We face a whole new kind of war. ...

MacArthur went on to say that the "Chinese strategic landscape" is now clear. The initial intervention in late October was to stop the advance of Union forces.Having achieved this, the Chinese disengaged in order to muster an overwhelming force for an offensive that would probably be launched in the spring. (MacArthur's timetable for the Chinese doesn't make much sense. If Chinese commanders don't intend to put their 10+ troops into combat within four months, then why would they expose those troops to the North Korean winter's ice and snow How about several months in the severe cold? It seems more logical to settle them in "Manchuria".) In MacArthur's view, the ultimate goal of the Chinese is to "completely destroy the United Nations forces in Korea."

MacArthur then complained that the tasks assigned to his troops had exceeded their capabilities.In the months to come, this kind of chatter would be a regular occurrence for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and it would irritate them immensely.MacArthur wrote:
At present, due to the freezing of the Yalu River, the Chinese have opened up more and more reinforcement and supply channels, which cannot be stopped by our air power.Obviously, our current military strength is not enough to deal with this undeclared war by the Chinese, and the right time and place are more beneficial to them.The resulting situation brought about an entirely new situation, one that expanded the possibilities for consideration on a worldwide basis, beyond the purview of the theater commander.The Command has done everything within its purview, but the situation it now faces is beyond its control and power.

MacArthur said he intends to "move from offense to defense and make such localized adjustments as may be required in light of the often-changing situation."He had completely forgotten what he had said just three days before when he launched the "offensive to end the war".Before that, his field commanders, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and his own intelligence officials had all warned of the dangers his approach posed.

General Omar Bradley phoned Truman at 6:15 a.m. to break the bad news.Bradley and the chiefs of staff of the armed services had discussed the situation the previous day, and they considered it "serious" but wondered "whether it was serious enough to be the kind of catastrophic failure our papers would have us believe."Bradley told Truman that the Chinese had "put both feet in."

The president immediately called a meeting of the National Security Council.Bradley's main concern was that the Communists might want to use their air power to the fullest.U.S. intelligence agencies estimate that there are at least 300 bombers deployed on the airfields of "Manchuria".Had these bombers entered the fight, they would have severely hit U.S. supply lines (the 8th Army consumes 3 tons of supplies a day, 000 tons of which were transported by air), or destroyed U.S. aircraft crowded on North Korean air bases.Bradley said the airfields were "extremely vulnerable" and that one airstrike had destroyed six U.S. aircraft.

Was it possible, Truman asked, to prevent an air attack?Air Force Chief of Staff General Hoyt Vandenberg replied that the only options were to bomb Manchuria or to withdraw the aircraft to Japan.

Secretary of Defense Marshall warned that the United States, whether unilaterally or as a member of the United Nations, should not be involved in an all-out war with China, "otherwise it will fall into a trap carefully laid by the Russians."He said.The United States should neither enter Chinese territory nor use Chinese Nationalist forces.

Bradley disagreed with MacArthur's complaints that he was not strong enough to complete the task. "MacArthur has enough troops there," he said. In any case, "we can't send any more ground troops now." (Secretary of the Army Frank Pace pointed out that there is only one division in the United States, the 82nd Airlift Division, and the National Guard units will not be ready until March 3 of the following year, and even "old and new" before January 15. Alternate" cannot be done.)
Marshall expressed concern about exposing Tenth Army units to northeastern North Korea.Marshall "thought he (MacArthur) would withdraw the attacking force" and the issue should be "considered here in Washington" as it involved direct engagement with China; Useless."

Politically sensitive Vice President Abe Buckley raised a public relations issue that he considered dangerous for his administration: MacArthur's "come home for Christmas" has been widely quoted.Buckley "wants to know whether (MacArthur) really said such things; and if he did, did he know what the consequences would be; and if so, why did he say such things".

Truman replied that MacArthur "did say that, and the Vice President would draw his own conclusions as to why".Bradley believes that MacArthur's "statement may have been addressed to the Chinese to show them that we are withdrawing from North Korea after this offensive."

The president hoped that there would be no remark that would make MacArthur "disgraceful in front of the Chinese."Marshall agreed that the government should "see this statement as an embarrassment that we should somehow avoid it".

The discussion then turned to what should or could be done about what Barkley called a "very depressing" situation.Marshall was up to no good."We want to avoid being tethered to North Korea," he said, but the question is: "How do we get out of North Korea with dignity?"

Acheson believed that the United States was "closer than ever to an all-out war."He still sees the Soviet Union as the chief culprit and mastermind behind the war.Still, "let's not say the USSR is responsible for this now because we can't do anything after making such accusations...it's due to the (sic) attitude of our allies" but the US should keep blaming China at the UN for the invaders.The Secretary of State also warned MacArthur that there was no need for him to occupy Northeast North Korea, "We cannot defeat the Chinese in North Korea, they can invest more troops than us".Acheson would "consider very, very carefully" the issue of air strikes on "Manchuria," "if it is essential to the rescue of our troops, then it is imperative."But if the United States does enter "Manchuria", "it will be very difficult to stop and easy to expand the conflict".If the United States wins in "Manchuria," then "the Russians will probably step in to aid their Chinese allies, regardless of the fact that they are at war with us. We will be more deeply involved. The priority is to find a path that we can defend." front, and hold it. This will help us align with our allies and show them that we are not belligerent and that we are waiting for the next move of the Chinese.”

Marshall concluded at the end of the meeting that MacArthur's offensive was still necessary to understand the intentions of the Chinese Communists."Now we know," he said.

Truman did take a cautious step.After the meeting, he called Marshall and ordered that all cables from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to MacArthur must be "passed through the Secretary of Defense to the President himself."

Joint Chiefs of Staff question MacArthur

MacArthur made his first public response to the fiasco.He claimed, implausibly, that it was the Chinese, not his troops, who were caught off guard.His command’s Nov. 11 press release, actually a condensed version of a cable he sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, portrayed the crisis as a “whole new war.”But he also added what the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered an outrageous big lie: that the UN offensive had "forced the enemy into combat prematurely" and thus interfered with their "subsequent surprise attack with overwhelming numbers." Our army position" plan.

However, what the Joint Chiefs of Staff did was just stand by and worry, allowing MacArthur to continue acting as if no one else was around.Admiral Sherman was concerned about the situation in Northeast Korea, where naval ships supporting X Corps were dangerously close to Vladivostok (Vladivostok).Sherman wanted to order MacArthur to withdraw the corps to a firm front, but the other chiefs of staff had been reluctant to give MacArthur direct orders, and instead only questioned MacArthur, hoping it would alert him to the danger.They asked on November 10: "How do you plan to coordinate the Eighth Army and the Tenth Army, and how to deploy the elements of the Tenth Army that we think are too exposed?" On the defensive, as he had requested in his first urgent telegram. "Strategic and tactical considerations are now paramount," said the cable from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.They suggested—but did not order—that MacArthur should consider closing the gap between the two forces and establishing a cohesive line of defense across the peninsula.

On the same day, the Joint Chiefs of Staff again rejected MacArthur's renewed, twice-rejected request to allow him to use Chinese Nationalist troops in North Korea.MacArthur noted that Chiang Kai-shek's previous proposals had been rejected because of fears that a Communist attack on Taiwan was imminent, and that using them in Korea would give China an excuse to enter the war.Since these considerations no longer apply and no other troops are readily available, MacArthur intends to negotiate directly with Chiang Kai-shek for the use of his troops.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff said in a draft reply that the use of Nationalist forces risked bringing Taiwan into war with the Chinese Communists.Secretary of Defense Marshall and Secretary of State Acheson revised the message to place more emphasis on political and diplomatic considerations.Truman himself agreed to the final text:

Your proposal is being considered. ...it involves worldwide impact.We have to consider the possibility that it will interfere with the coherence of the countries we work with at the United Nations and isolate us.It may be completely unacceptable for the countries of the (British) Commonwealth to use their military forces with the Chinese Nationalists.This risks extending hostilities to Taiwan and elsewhere.Incidentally, our leadership at the United Nations is suffering the most serious damage, and the utmost care must be taken to avoid undermining a vital group of allies in the United Nations.

MacArthur's present performance immediately became contradictory and confusing.These actions show that he is both confused and panicked, and he does not want the reality he is in to destroy the fantasy of his intention.The first in this curious sequence of actions was his summoning to Tokyo on November 11th of his two field commanders, Generals Walker and Almond, to a "war conference." (“They cannot afford to leave the field at this time,” General Collins commented sarcastically.) Their conversation was not recorded, but the decision was reached: Eighth Army must withdraw far enough away from the Chinese at the same time, X Corps was to abandon MacArthur's order to "advance on the Yalu River" and withdraw to the Hamhung-Hungnam area (General Smith of the Marine Corps had been pushing for this course of action, but two weeks ago vetoed by MacArthur).A suggestion was also briefly discussed (it would be ridiculous to repeat it here) that the 28rd Army Division should advance westward from the Wonsan area on the east coast to strike at the Chinese fighting on the right flank of the Eighth Army, which would probably take across half of the Korean peninsula.The idea came from Gen. Edwin Wright, Tenth Army's assistant chief of staff, in response to MacArthur's question of how the corps could relieve pressure on Eighth Army.Almond should be thanked, he stepped in, and pointed out the proposed marching route through the Taibai Mountains by skillfully pointing a few times with the pointer on the map for the participants to refer to.No matter how it is marked on the map, there is no way to find the mountain.He said that if the 8rd Division passed through this place, the entire army would be wiped out.Incredibly, Almond later agreed to support this proposal on the condition that General Walker resupply the division as it crossed the western slopes of the Taebaek Mountains.Walker couldn't do that, and he was wise enough to keep silent.MacArthur said he would make a decision later. (A few hours later, MacArthur issued a brief march order for this westward movement, but then withdrew it.)
MacArthur announced these decisions (which amounted to being forced to withdraw his entire force) in a telegram dated 11 November, however they downplayed the concerns of the Joint Chiefs of Staff about his forces and deployed them for him way to justify.MacArthur claimed that, far from being in danger of serious casualties, the Tenth Army actually threatened the main Chinese supply line against the Eighth Army and held back six to eight Chinese divisions; Attack the flank of the 29th Army.MacArthur did not say how X Corps would accomplish this task once it had withdrawn to the coast.The orders he gave to the troops were very different from what he told the Joint Chiefs of Staff about the troops' actions.For his part, General Smith, who had been dealing with MacArthur for years, was able to seize the opportunity he had been waiting for weeks.As soon as the 10th Army was ordered to withdraw its aborted offensive, he immediately asked the 8st Marine Division to start thinking about ways to save itself.

However, MacArthur did not heed the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he put troops on the front line.Doing so "wouldn't work" because of the distance, the low numbers of his troops, and the logistical problems posed by the mountains that stretch across central Korea.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff found MacArthur's rhetoric unconvincing.As General Bradley read the photocopied text of the telegram, he scribbled skeptical comment after skeptical comment in the margins, especially next to the claim that Tenth Army was "threatening" enemy supply lines.He drew a large question mark next to the reasons MacArthur gave for the corps' failure to join Eighth Army.When Army historian Robert Watson interviewed Bradley 10 years later, he found it "insulting" that the general still remembered the telegram, one of many received from MacArthur.Bradley told Watson "with a little passion" that MacArthur "treated us like children."But what is incomprehensible is why the Joint Chiefs of Staff would tolerate such behavior?
(End of this chapter)