The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 76
Less than two hours after receiving this telegram, the chiefs of staff of the Joint Conference received another telegram from MacArthur, which was full of panic.Despite all possible air blockade measures, the Chinese continued to build up their military strength.The intelligence report said Chinese troops could reach the front line after a two-night march, making it possible to "constantly and rapidly build up".He believed that the continued retreat of the Eighth Army was inevitable. "All of this leads to the conclusion," he said, that the Chinese military's intent was to "totally destroy" the U.N. forces.

This somber news led to a fourth meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on November 11, from 29:3 to 10:4 p.m.However, the chiefs of staff of the Joint Conference were still reluctant to give MacArthur direct orders.They did express their concern in slightly stronger terms: there could be a "growing gap" between the 55th and 8th armies.The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that elements of X Corps should "withdraw from their exposed positions as soon as possible" and that the two forces "should be sufficiently coordinated to prevent large Chinese forces from passing between the two forces or surrounding them , which is crucial.The Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed the above-mentioned concerns not in order, but in the form of "hope", hoping that MacArthur will consider it when planning the next step.

When the draft telegram was sent to Marshall for review, he added an instruction to MacArthur: "It is not necessary to take into account the entire area northeast of North Korea's waist (the area of ​​operation of the Tenth Army), unless it is from strategic and Tactical considerations."

In the spring of the following year (1951), at a hearing after MacArthur's dismissal, Bradley was asked why the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not take direct action to close the loophole.Bradley replied:
Oh... we were a little apprehensive looking at the map from here. …We did not send him any cables about our concerns about deployment, because we cannot fight or command a battle from 7 miles away.You have to let your field commander lead the fight.

According to General Collins, Bradley "may add that just as the Joint Chiefs of Staff cannot fight a war from 7 miles away, General MacArthur cannot fight a war from 000 miles away."

Truman's Dilemma
For Harry Truman, bad news on the battlefield heralded the beginning of the worst month of his presidency. At the beginning of December 1950, his government was in a dilemma: losing an overseas war while alienating traditional allies such as Britain.Domestic opposition was also now overwhelming, and the Republican victory in the November 12 congressional elections heralded the turning point.The Democratic majority in the Senate has been reduced from 1950 seats to 11 seats; in the House of Representatives, its majority has also been reduced from 12 seats to 2 seats.The lost senators included three of Truman's strongest supporters on Capitol Hill: Majority Leader Scott Lucas of Illinois; Chairman of the Armed Services Committee Millard Tydings of Maryland; Majority Whip, Francis Myers of Pennsylvania.In contrast, Republican senators have added strong supporters of the Chinese Nationalists, such as Richard Nixon of California, Everett Dirkson of Illinois and John Butler of Maryland, and the administration's arch-enemies, Robert Taft of Ohio, Booker Hickenlooper of Iowa, Eugene Milliken of Colorado, Homer Capehart of Indiana, and Vermont Alexander Wiley.Moreover, victorious Republicans had campaigned to blame Truman for “losing” China and other victories for communism, and even blamed Western setbacks on a “cabal” within the administration.They wanted a more aggressive anti-Mao policy, less obedience to Western allies like Britain, less economic aid, and a "clean-up" of the State Department, starting with Acheson and down to everyone.Richard Stebbings of the Council on Foreign Relations notes that the administration's foreign policy has never been immune to criticism, although it is doubtful that those critics represent a significant portion of American public opinion.However, "after November 17, there is no doubt that a considerable majority of Americans no longer sympathize with the government's policies and have doubts about its goals." Arthur Crocker of The New York Times wrote the day after the ballots were released that the State Department was the "loser" in the election.

Robert Taft saw the outcome of the election as a bright path to the presidency in 1952.His big win in Ohio made him the frontrunner for the Republican presidential nomination, and he isn't planning to run as a "me too" internationalist, which he sees as Thomas Dewey's defeat in 1948 s reason.Biographer William White, who was close to Taft, summed up the Ohio native's thinking: the White House would require a "sharp, earth-shattering campaign, aggressive from beginning to end, so that he or any truly credible Republicans are invincible."Moreover, Taft was prepared to abandon the bipartisan foreign policy that had been the hallmark of American politics since the war.He concluded that the Democrats, with their congressional majorities, would prevail on domestic issues; while the Republicans would gain a lot on many security-related issues: secret deals with the Soviets in Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam; The loss of the monopoly on atomic weapons; the case of Alger Hiss and others accused of espionage; the victory of the Communist Party in China.Now, Truman has messed up the Korean War again.

Taft turned his attack on Acheson.According to political scientist John Spanier, Acheson was "a symbol of America's global involvement and the target of much of the fear and disappointment that arose from it."Republicans, especially Senator McCarthy, succeeded in portraying Acheson as "soft on communism."This has been the great caricature of American politics, but one that the Kremlin certainly does not share.Acheson was largely credited with shaping the Truman Doctrine, when the British abruptly relinquished their historic responsibilities to Greece and Turkey, and the United States stood by those two countries, thereby preventing Soviet advances in the Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa.Acheson helped formulate the Marshall Plan to economically prop up Western Europe, and formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which brought West Germany into the US-European military bloc.And, on the Sunday of the North Korean invasion, Dean Acheson was the No. 1 adviser to Truman, even before the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to recommend a military response to the challenge.

But Acheson did not have a high personal reputation in Washington.He served only one constituency—Harry Truman—and even friendly Democratic senators felt uncomfortable around him. The November 1950 election results convinced members of Congress that getting too close to Acheson was politically dangerous.

On November 11, Taft began to attack the foreign policy of the Truman administration with great fanfare, demanding that the United States "re-examine" the scale, method and nature of military and economic assistance to Europe. (Acheson retorted, comparing Taft to "a farmer who goes out every morning to pluck the seedlings.") A few days later, Taft announced to Truman that he would send four divisions to strengthen the defenses of Europe and appointed German General White Eisenhower challenged the NATO commander-in-chief's decision.Taft and his close ally, Senator Kenneth Wheely, introduced a motion reflecting the Senate's intention to stop sending troops to Europe until a policy on NATO was enacted "by Congress."

The debate that followed continued into the spring of 1951, putting the Truman administration at a distinct disadvantage.The debate also raised questions that Truman's aides found difficult to answer publicly.The troops sent to Europe were merely a diversionary force, unable to stop the Red Army, which was tantamount to throwing themselves into a losing land war.Deploying troops on the borders of Soviet satellites was in any case provocative and unhelpful, since they were extremely vulnerable to atomic attack.Besides, why bother to protect Europe when you're not willing to do your best for Taiwan and South Korea in the Far East?Taft and his supporters advocated the use of sea and air power.In their view, Europe is expendable. "In my opinion," Taft said during a debate, "we are perfectly capable of defending America itself (emphasis added)."

Debates over foreign policy politically constrained Truman's freedom of action in Asia.With Republicans accusing his administration of “losing” China, he could under no circumstances secure a seat in the United Nations for Beijing, or thereby remove America’s security obligations to Chiang Kai-shek, for peace.Douglas MacArthur saw this in Tokyo, and he made many provocative remarks in December 1950 because he could count on the protection of the Taft Republicans.

But Taft was incoherent when it came to Asia. In June 1950, he believed that the North Koreans' invasion was instigated by the Soviets and worried that it would "lead to war with Soviet Russia. It is entirely possible that Soviet Russia would intervene ... to help the North Koreans, the current limited ... The conflict would spread throughout the civilized world."However, Taft later obeyed MacArthur.After China entered the war, he believed that "Russia will not regard bombing China without sending troops to invade as an aggression against Russia itself, or as a reason for war."Taft supported MacArthur's demands such as the bombing of "Manchuria," the imposition of a naval blockade of China, and the use of Nationalist troops for invasion or threat of invasion "to keep southern China in turmoil."He has no fear that a "harder" US policy in Asia will turn the Korean War into a nuclear holocaust.Oddly, he didn't want a "harder" policy in Europe that would anger the Soviet Union, so he voted against ratifying the NATO treaty and sending U.S. troops to Europe.

Taft also took an unblushing setback on whether Truman was right or wrong in his response to North Korea.He also believed in June that it was in the national interest of the United States to oppose communist invasion; Every U.S. soldier sent to North Korea."Taft himself didn't know what he wanted: several times he advocated the withdrawal of U.S. troops to Japan, Okinawa, and Taiwan; a few days later, he would support MacArthur's demand for bolder actions against China.

To lay citizens who are not immersed in the minutiae of diplomacy and politics day in and day out, Taft's critique is a confusing and frustrating cliché.Americans read in the daily newspapers that things were going badly in North Korea and that American troops might have to retreat.An indecisive Truman was as bewildering as Taft, never acknowledging the fact that the country was at war or ordering the mobilization that would bring America to war.He wanted to fight a war that would not interfere with everyday life in America, and businesses, workers, consumers, and farmers all wanted to enjoy the continued prosperity of the postwar economy.But public discontent with the war grew every week, and Harry Truman ended up satisfying hardly anyone.

An event on December 12 showed that the Republican Party was determined to remove Truman from office.The president summoned leaders of both parties to the White House to discuss declaring a national emergency, ramping up production of military equipment and imposing some controls on the economy.Acheson felt that Senators Taft, Whirley, and Alexander Smith were "uncharacteristically taciturn and uncommunicative" when they met.Later, while the secretaries were tidying up the room, someone found a memo written on the letterhead of the Republican Policy Committee.The memo was not signed, but it was where Wheely had sat.The memo recommends opposing Republican participation in any effort to declare a national emergency "so that the party's position can be maintained in the event of an effort to impeach the President."After some discussion, a White House staffer called Whirley to say that a "sealed envelope" had been found after the meeting and asked if he had lost anything.

"I left it there!" he exclaimed.The envelope was returned to him, sealed, but Truman already knew its contents.

MacArthur shirks responsibility
MacArthur's troops were retreating steadily, but he did his best to maintain his image of an infallible combat commander.The record shows that he knew he was getting himself into trouble because of his loose talk - if his troops "went home for Christmas" it would be a defeat, not a triumph.So MacArthur can't wait to rewrite the history of the previous week, which is undoubtedly the most rapid history revisionist ever.MacArthur realized that both Americans and Europeans would be looking for scapegoats, so it was important to reformulate the purpose of his offensive and show that the failure of the offensive was due to political constraints imposed by Washington, not a command error on the battlefield.MacArthur himself was constantly being interviewed, and his headquarters also issued special "statements" frequently, dazzling: on November 11, a special bulletin was sent to Ray Henry of the little-known radio news program "Outside the Three Stars"; On November 28, he responded to an inquiry from Arthur Crocker, the most prestigious journalist in the United States and the chief correspondent of The New York Times in Washington; on December 11, he accepted an interview with US News and World Report; On the same day, a long telegram was sent to Hugh Bailey, President of United Press International.Other interviews and cables included Ward Price of the Daily Mail in London (to influence foreign readers), and Barry Faris, executive editor of the International News Service.MacArthur emphasized three points in these remarks:
First, he repeated what he had initially said in his Nov. 11 cable to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that his offensive forced the Chinese into a premature move, disrupting their plan for a surprise attack that would have cost them Destroy U.S. forces and occupy North Korea in "an unstoppable act."

(End of this chapter)