The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 77
Second, he denied the notion that the Chinese were involved because he went too far into North Korea.Every step he takes complies with UN resolutions.He blasted the "misleading and obnoxious gossip" that he was ordered to stop at the [-]th parallel, Pyongyang, or "any front that does not reach the international border". (Strictly speaking, MacArthur was right. However, he deliberately avoided the military order, that is, only South Korean troops, not American troops, were allowed to operate in the border area near "Manchuria.") "Warning the United Nations is a basic principle of the CCP leaders. A long-planned decision, the immediate cause of which was the disastrous defeat of the armies of their satellite North Korea.  …”

Third, and MacArthur's most vocal, was his objection to the press's portrayal of his "planned retreat" from North Korea as a "retreat" (MacArthur apparently succeeded in hiding his intentions from his field commanders).He scolded "ignorant" reporters for not being able to distinguish between a skilful retreat and an army's "fleeing in panic."MacArthur did appreciate some of the "tactical successes" of the Chinese, but said that this was only due to their absolute superiority in numbers and at the "staggering cost of casualties."He was particularly angry at the "irresponsible comments" in the European press and criticized the "selfish and short-sighted views" of Europeans, who believed that defending their own continent was more important than defending Asia.

Finally, MacArthur veiled his criticism of his superiors in Washington for prohibiting him from crossing the Yalu River against Communist forces.

In response to U.S. News & World Report, he said:
QUESTION: Do you believe that limiting your unfettered pursuit of Chinese ... forces and unfettered attacks on their bases prevents effective military operations?
A: This is a huge hindrance, unprecedented in military history.

Q: How do you explain the fact that the enemy has no air power, but is able to make effective progress against an army with considerable air power?
ANSWER: This is because of the limitations mentioned above, combined with the mode of movement that makes it extremely difficult for air forces to support ground operations, and the fact that the neutral sanctuary is close to the battlefield, which prevents the air force from realizing its strategic potential.

Q: Is this a big lesson for the US program?
Answer: Yes.

The following two questions are about the use of the atomic bomb. MacArthur's answer is evasive and chilling.

Q: Can you talk about the effectiveness and ineffectiveness of using (atomic) bombs in the way you conduct combat?
A: My comment would be inappropriate at this point.

QUESTION: With the type of operations currently being conducted in North Korea, is the concentration of enemy forces sufficient for our side to use this weapon effectively?
A: My comment would be inappropriate at this point.

MacArthur paints a somber picture of his travails: "Never was human endurance so severely tested, nor were the noble principles of human conduct so steadfastly honed and so steadfastly defended, as in the Korean campaign. "

The remarks made Truman angry, especially the article in U.S. News & World Report, a magazine that was his arch-rival.In the eyes of the president, MacArthur committed the crime of forming gangs with his political opponents.Truman later told his confidants that he had intended to "remove MacArthur" months earlier, but with the UN forces in trouble, Truman felt compelled to defend the general to his critics, especially Europeans.He said at a press conference on November 11: "When a person wins every day, people always support him; but when he encounters a little trouble, they all criticize him and accuse him of doing this. That, and they didn't tell him to do it before." MacArthur "did a good job and will do a good job".But Truman privately taunted MacArthur that night at the beginning of his diary:

It's been a hectic month.General Mike was as rambling as ever.One speech he made before the election cost us some votes, and one speech he made after the election landed him in trouble in Europe and at home.Even though he has demolished me on many different occasions, I still have to defend him and save face for him.But I have to side with my comrades. Doesn't Mike "like" the words of this man he thinks is "inferior"?
MacArthur's speech to the press disgusted Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett, who told Dean Acheson that MacArthur was "scared" and that he was publishing a "message to posterity."Lovett disputed MacArthur's assertion that officials had not warned him that it was unwise to push the border, calling MacArthur's remarks "false and fabricated."He also thought it was "the most extraordinary thing he had ever seen: .

As MacArthur continued to make critical remarks, Truman finally moved to silence him.The president issued two orders on December 12 to all administration officials—but apparently to MacArthur.The first order prohibits any "speech, press release, or other public statement" "pertaining to foreign policy" without the approval of the State Department, which aims to ensure that publicly released information is "accurate and consistent with U.S. government policy." unanimous".The second command is more specific.Overseas officials, including military commanders and diplomatic representatives, should "exercise extreme caution in public speaking, subject all but routine statements to the approval of the respective authorities, and refrain from communicating with the United States on military or foreign policy matters," the order said. newspapers, magazines or other public media."The order slowed down comments from MacArthur's headquarters, but only temporarily—quieting MacArthur was not silencing him.

casually talk about the atomic bomb

Despite the president's efforts to silence MacArthur himself, he touched the most sensitive nerves of his European allies, as well as many Americans, by speaking casually about the use of nuclear weapons in North Korea.Since the outbreak of the war, the Pentagon has been studying the conditions under which atomic weapons might be used. On November 11, a week before MacArthur's offensive, General Lawton Collins told his colleagues: "It is believed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff will soon be called for an opinion on the use of the atomic bomb in Korea. It is also conceivable that the In the event of an all-out Chinese Communist offensive, the use of atomic bombs on their concentration of troops and materiel may be the decisive factor in enabling UN forces to hold a line of defense, or to make an early (one) push to the 'Manchurian' frontier." He suggested Conduct research on contingency conditions for the use of nuclear weapons.

A week passed, and it was clear that nothing Collins had suggested was going to happen.At this time, the Chinese had joined the war on a large scale. On November 11, Rear Admiral Lehrer, secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, submitted a "priority" request to the Joint Strategic Studies Board.Should the Soviets intervene, Lehrer wished to propose "the possible use of atomic bombs as a factor in preventing such intervention from proceeding, or assisting in the withdrawal of United Nations troops from North Korea."He asked for opinions on the number of atomic bombs that might be used, the target areas, and considerations as to "method of use, timing, mode of transportation, etc.," and the question of "the use of conventional or atomic bombs against China with or without an ultimatum." Express views.

Even the possible use of atomic weapons was a closely guarded secret in the bureaucracy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.Lehrer's memo contained a caveat: "Only the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has the sole copy of this memorandum. The Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered that access to this matter be strictly limited."

While the staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was still working on the issue, President Truman sparked discussion of nuclear weapons during a press conference on November 11.The language the president used was neither rigorous nor legally accurate.

Anthony Liverro, reporter for The New York Times: Mr. President, does the attack on "Manchuria" depend on the actions of the United Nations?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, exactly.

LEVERRO: In other words, if the UN had authorized General MacArthur to go further, would he have done so?

THE PRESIDENT: We will take whatever steps are necessary to meet the needs of the military situation, as we have always done.

New York Daily News reporter Jack Doherty: Does that include the use of the atomic bomb?
THE PRESIDENT: That includes any weapons that we have.

CHICAGO DAILY NEWS REPORTER PAUL LEACH: Mr. President, do you mean the use of the atomic bomb is being actively considered when you say "any weapon we have"?
THE PRESIDENT: The use of the atomic bomb has been actively considered.I don't want to see it used.It is a terrible weapon and it should not be used against innocent men, women and children who had nothing to do with this military invasion.And if the atomic bomb is used, that's what will happen.

Veteran UPI reporter Merriman Smith apparently believes the president has gone further on the issue than he originally intended.He gave Truman a chance to back off gradually.

MERRIMAN SMITH: Mr. President, I want to go back to the issue of the atomic bomb that I just mentioned.Do we clearly understand what you mean: the use of the atomic bomb is being actively considered?

THE PRESIDENT: We've been actively considering it, Smith.This is one of our weapons.

INTERNATIONAL PRESS ROBERT DIXON: Mr. President, is this meant to hit military targets or civilian --

THE PRESIDENT (interrupting) That's something for the military guys to decide.I'm not a military authority that approves these things.

The reporters asked a few questions and then returned to the atomic bomb.

FRANK BUGOLZER, NBC News: You just said, Mr. President, that it depends on what the United Nations does.Does this mean we will not use atomic bombs unless authorized by the UN?

THE PRESIDENT: No, not at all that.Action against China depends on the actions of the United Nations, and the military commander in the field is responsible for the use of weapons, as he usually does (emphasis added).

President Truman was dead wrong, as a distraught White House press office put it in a "clarifying statement" hours later.Under the Atomic Energy Act, only the president can authorize the use of atomic bombs.But before the clarification was issued, the Associated Press and the United Press had already sprinted around the world Truman's blunder, which, writes Edward Flyard of The Washington Post, sparked "national and international outcry." Public opinion was in an uproar."British officials said they were "shocked and dismayed" by the claims.They believe that this means that the elusive MacArthur can now use his hands and feet to use the atomic bomb on the Chinese.

Although Truman was never known for his precise language, his miswords about the powers a president wields over such a sensitive matter were so striking that they left people wondering.Truman said in his memoirs (sometimes a poor record) that the press had misunderstood him, but he did not quote his own statement that the use of nuclear weapons "was a matter for the men of the military to decide."There is one piece of evidence that Truman was not lying: he intended to warn the Chinese and the Soviets of the danger of all-out war if violence escalated in Korea.

Here's what happened: On the afternoon of November 11, hours after Truman's press conference, Belgian ambassador to Washington Baron Silverkress met with Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk.Belgian Foreign Minister Paul Van Zelland, who chairs the European Commission's Council of Ministers, regularly meets with other Western European leaders, Silverkress noted, so he can "pass any thoughts we might have" to those people.Rusk replied that the United States was prepared to "do everything in our power to avoid all-out war, but we are not prepared to withdraw from North Korea."

According to Rusk, Baron Silverkrice then referred to Truman's statement about the atomic bomb, "and asked me if I meant we were going to use it".Rusk replied, "I can't say whether we're going to use the bomb." Silvercrest said he "speculated" that the president meant that since the president himself could authorize the use of the bomb, the president would defer to military commanders in the field suggestion.

Rusk never mentioned nuclear weapons again in subsequent conversations.But as he walks Silvercriss to the elevator, the Belgian says that if the United States does intend to introduce the atomic bomb into the war, "he sees no particular value in using the atomic bomb on a Chinese city. Why not go further and destroy the Soviet-made atomic bomb facilities?" Silvercriss pointed out that those facilities "are located not very far from our current area of ​​operations in a straight line."

Rusk did not answer the question, but the gist of his talk suggested that a friendly ambassador was getting ambiguous information for his foreign secretary to disseminate in European capitals.If Truman really wanted to engage in nuclear blackmail, his message would quickly reach the Chinese and the Soviets.

Whatever Truman's motives, his comments caused an uproar in the British Parliament, with the American embassy calling it "the most intense, anxious and responsible debate in the House of Commons on foreign affairs since Labor came to power in 1945".About 100 Labor MPs have signed a letter to Prime Minister Clement Attlee opposing the use of atomic bombs under any circumstances.Discontent in Parliament was widespread, even among such loyal friends of America as Sir Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden, both Conservatives who had left the field.Richard Butler, another Conservative leader, said: "The British people as a whole want reassurance before their fate (which is extended to the war in China) is decided: that they are participating in determining their own destiny."

During the debate, Attlee's aides hurriedly called the American embassy.The prime minister said he would close the debate by announcing his readiness to meet with Truman to discuss "matters of mutual concern."The president quickly agreed.Tensions eased temporarily in the British Parliament, with cheers erupting during the adjournment.

Allied Rebellion at the United Nations

At the same time, the government heard complaints from the United Nations.Warren Austin, the ambassador to the United Nations, reported that there was a growing "distrust" of MacArthur because he was seen as "not very commanding." On November 11, even before Truman started the uproar over atomic weapons, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, the British ambassador to the United Nations, and Jean Chauvre, the French ambassador to the United Nations, discussed American Policy clashes with Ernest Gross of the State Department.They emphasized Europe's concern that being "on the front lines and leaving the door open to a full-scale Soviet military assault" they did not want "an Asian octopus to suck up all our common strength."Jeb bluntly said that as long as six Labor MPs abstained in a vote of confidence on North Korea, the Attlee government would fall, so Attlee had little room for maneuver.

On the evening of November 11, ambassadors from Western countries rushed to Austin, the US ambassador to the United Nations. Truman's speech on nuclear weapons made them deeply worried.Schauffer said the Dutch representative asked him "with tears in his eyes" if he had any chance of avoiding war.Jebb said that the rest of Western Europe shared the "huge fear" of the British that the US was drawing them into war in Asia "at an inconceivable time and under the most difficult strategic conditions that could arise".Europeans do not want to accuse China of being an aggressor, since this would amount to an attempt to "reconquer and liberate" the "regions" already captured by Beijing.

The united front of the United Nations quickly fell apart.

Washington considers retreat
11月30日至12月1日夜间抵达华盛顿的电报报告说，战场局势急剧恶化。那天（星期五）上午8时30分，对战争的看法更为忧郁的人群之一集聚在参谋长联席会议的会议室里。自战争初期以来，这是头一次听到认真讨论美国是否应承认战败和从朝鲜全部撤退的问题。

(End of this chapter)