The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 78
A key issue is what Dean Acheson calls "the actual state of panic among our friends" at the United Nations.He said that many people complained about the bankruptcy of American leadership, and that "the current difficulties are caused by the wrong actions of General MacArthur".Acheson believed that the restoration of unity was essential for European security.

Acheson proposed to find a line of defense that could be defended militarily, and then use this as a basis to start political negotiations to end the war.He also saw dangers: the possibility that the Chinese would refuse to accept fixed fronts; and that, even if the United States withdrew from North Korea and the Chinese retreated to their northeast, the South Koreans would still have to deal with the North Koreans. "The question is where does that put us?" Acheson said.

"In any case," he went on, "we must do something in North Korea. And we must do something to counter the sharp resurgence of neutralism in Germany." Acheson plans to speak at the United Nations General Assembly next week, but the United States First there must be an agreed plan of action.

Acheson wanted to hear the opinion of the military.If a front cannot be held militarily, "then we face a new set of problems and have to consider a variety of different situations".

General Bradley could only offer pessimistic scenarios.Unless the 10th Army was redeployed, "it would be very difficult to hold a front. It is still uncertain that if we suffer heavy losses in the east, we will not have enough troops to hold a front."Bradley mentioned intelligence that traffic from "Manchuria" was extremely heavy."We may have to fall back even further," he said, repeating the directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, approved by Truman, and communicated to MacArthur the night before: From the perspective of the mission of the United Nations forces, it was not necessary to hold the area north of the waist of the bee , unless, from considerations concerning the safety of his troops, "he may not be concerned with this area".

But what is the most beneficial course of action?Acheson asked.

Neither Bradley nor General Lawton Collins had an answer. (It turned out that General Marshall asked Collins to travel to Japan and North Korea that day to find some sort of answer.)
Naval Chief of Staff Forrest Sherman said: "From a strategic point of view, the United States should leave North Korea and withdraw to the Japanese archipelago." However, he pointed out that abandoning North Korea "is dangerous for Japan because North Korea has an airfield there." , so the United States should hold on to the waist of the North Korean bee and regard this as a long-term strategic plan.

Sherman marveled at the way the Chinese had allowed the United Nations to gain air supremacy.He strongly objected (even without naming names) to MacArthur's request that he be allowed to bomb "Manchuria" airfields.He said: "Until our situation improves, we should not intervene in this situation." At present, "maintaining the right to control the air on our side of the border outweighs the disadvantages."If the Russian Air Force intervenes, "we probably won't be able to maintain air supremacy."But even if the situation is stabilized, will the United States still send other ships and troops to North Korea at the expense of Atlantic defense?
What should the United States do if the Chinese send planes into the war?Bradley doesn't want to predetermine this.If they fired back, "the Soviet air force might be called in. If so, we might have to postpone the attack."

General Collins firmly supported Bradley. "If we fire back," he said, "it will be a serious provocation to the Chinese, and may lead to the participation of the Soviet air force and even submarines. The only thing that will save us then is the use of atomic bombs or the threat of using atomic bombs. Therefore, We should avoid bombing China, even if it means that our ground forces must take some hits from the air." In Collins' view, "Since the Russians have positions in Vladivostok (Vladivostok) and on the other flank, North Korea is worthless."

CIA Director General Walter Biddle Smith reported that a new CIA estimate "presents a much better picture than . . . the previous view that Russia planned to enter the war soon."The Soviets' primary objective was to thwart the European rearmament mission."They may not be going to war with us now, but they would if they could get us in trouble in Asia," Smith said. The CIA chief's advice was blunt: "We should withdraw now." North Korea, although our retreat will not solve the problem. The Russians must think that we do not intend to fight in Asia, and therefore think they can force us as much as they like. . . . Armament efforts."

Undersecretary of Defense Robert Lovett is trying to bring a consensus: Although North Korea is not a key region, losing it could harm Japan.Therefore, "it is better to hold North Korea for political purposes. We should redeploy troops and buy time with delay. The result may be a joint withdrawal from North Korea."

The meeting conducted further discussions on how to deal with China's large-scale air strikes.Both Bradley and Smith believed that if Russia did support the Chinese, the U.S. forces would have to retreat and a war would be possible.That, Collins chimed in, meant either "the threat of an atomic bomb, or the use of an atomic bomb."

Acheson ended by asking the question straightforwardly: What did the military think about accepting the ceasefire and returning to the [-]th Parallel?From a military point of view, he asked, is this the "best option, do they (senior military figures) consider it a blessing that such an arrangement has been made"?
Generals Bradley, Collins, and Admiral Sherman all agreed, though both Marshall and Collins said, "We shouldn't be in favor of this move yet."

At the end of the discussion, General Marshall said, somewhat feebly, "Accepting a cease-fire would show great weakness on our side." No one wanted to discuss that statement any further.So, for an hour, in the hallowed place of the Pentagon conference room, the United States decided to abandon any notion of victory in North Korea, and decided to try to strike the best deal possible and withdraw, based on an as-yet-undetermined ceasefire line war.

America will not win in North Korea.

congressional inquiry

Coincidentally, the day of the fateful Pentagon meeting (December 12) also happened to be the day President Truman asked Congress for an additional $1 billion to support the war effort—four times the Pentagon’s annual budget before the Korean War.To gain support, he invited congressional leaders to the White House to brief them on the war and the general international situation.

Members of Congress were not happy with what they heard.Rep. John McCormack (D-Mass.) asked, "It's well known that the CCP has been deploying large numbers of troops in 'Manchuria,' isn't it?"

"Yes," General Bradley replied.

"Don't MacArthur's headquarters have an intelligence department?" McCormack asked sarcastically.

General Walter Biddle Smith of the CIA spoke of ominous omens on the Soviet side. "Soviet-controlled parts of Europe have been very quiet for the past 10 days, and that in itself is a disturbing event," Smith said.The Russians had just finished "a huge exercise" involving 50 troops and focused on air operations and river crossings.An estimated 60 to 70 percent of the Soviet armed forces were deployed west of the Ural Mountains, eyeing Western Europe.

Senator Kenneth Wheely wanted to know how Smith got those numbers.Smith said the army figures come from "attachments, defectors, deserters and 'other means'".Wheely asked if the CIA used "all sources."

"We are immoral," Smith replied. (This remark elicits a burst of laughter.)
Smith then spoke about the guerrillas operating in China.Their equipment was "extremely underdeveloped" but "work is being done to improve that," he said.

Senator Wheely asked what kind of help was being provided to the guerrillas.Smith would not answer specifically, but he did say that "aid is being provided in the form of money, advice and 'goals'".

Truman went on to talk about the purpose of the meeting.He will make a "significant" request to Congress for $170 billion in additional funding due to the Chinese offensive.He is asking Congress to act now, as the crisis has sped up military acquisitions by about 18 months. "We're trying to get by mid-1952 what we were going to get by mid-1953," the president said.

At the end of the meeting, Truman urged members of Congress to remember that they were hearing "highly classified" intelligence. "Don't tell anyone, not even your wives. I can't hear what you're hearing here today if I don't urge these people to tell me."

Senator Richard Russell (D-Georgia) is sorry he heard all this.He thought he didn't talk in his sleep, and he hoped he wouldn't tonight.

Is America begging for peace?

Whether viewed from Washington, Tokyo or the ever-changing Korean battlefield, Saturday, Dec. 12, can be counted as one of the most depressing days since the war began.At a State Department meeting earlier in the morning, Dean Acheson told his staff to start thinking about how to negotiate a cease-fire with the Soviets, the Chinese, or both.A UN resolution continued to be discussed at the meeting, but Acheson made it clear that the overriding factor was the Pentagon's "extremely pessimistic" view of the war situation.

In a report circulated around 10 a.m., the CIA concluded that "it is absolutely impossible for the Chinese regime to take this risk without concrete assurances of effective Soviet support." The CIA predicted: "Once The Soviets would openly support China militarily under the Sino-Soviet treaty with the United States taking massive action against Chinese territory." risk of war".Whether the Soviets themselves were ready for global war, however, is a question the CIA says it cannot answer either.

Staff discussions continued throughout the day at the State Department, Defense Department and CIA.As night fell, Acheson and General Marshall were ready to report to Truman at the White House.

Bradley bluntly said that within 48 hours to 72 hours, the military situation will have a "collapsed situation"; from a logistical point of view, the 10th Army can retreat within 5 days, but he is very concerned about the "method of retreat." "Not sure," "unless a ceasefire is assured"; the 7th Infantry Division "could be saved" and the 3rd Division, located near the port, "could be pulled out"; but "we can't just pull our troops out without leaving South Korea The capital division and other divisions don't care."

Even a "Dunkirk-style" retreat could be difficult if the Chinese launched an air attack, Marshall said."Saving our troops or preserving our national honor," Marshall said, created a dilemma.

Truman asked about MacArthur's repeated requests to fight across the border.Acheson said any such decision should be made "entirely on whether it harms or helps our forces."He believes: "We need to make a very accurate judgment in the military, that is, if we destroy the Chinese airport, whether it will attract the Russians." This decision should not be made by MacArthur, but by Secretary of Defense Marshall in Collins. with the assistance of the general, who was on his way to Tokyo and North Korea.

Then, Acheson tried to propose to replace MacArthur as commander of the U.S. Army in the Far East, and he made this proposal indirectly.Acheson proposed that Collins should "stay in Tokyo" during this crisis.The Secretary of State fully understood that the presence of the Army Chief of Staff would put MacArthur in a subordinate position. ("I have completely lost confidence in MacArthur's judgment," Acheson wrote in his memoirs.) However, no one in the Joint Chiefs of Staff supported Acheson, and his proposals were lost without support. Of.

Thus, the discussion returns to possible actions by the UN Security Council.In Truman's view, such action was at best a "delay strategy" and the more important question was what the Chinese would ask "as compensation for a settlement."Acheson thought: "They will at least ask us to go back to the south of the [-]th parallel." Marshall thinks they will not "only ask for such a little thing."Acheson believes that the demands of the Chinese will gradually increase: the United States will leave North Korea; China will gain a seat in the United Nations;

No one wants to take on the responsibility of proposing a ceasefire to the Chinese.Marshall pointed out that the crisis will reach its peak before the scheduled meeting between the President and Prime Minister Attlee is three days away.The British should be consulted before "any definite steps are taken".Marshall thought there was a way to save America some semblance of face: "It would be better for Mr. Attlee to come up with a conciliatory proposal than for us to bear the burden of making one."

The discussion turned again to domestic issues.Acheson wanted to "strengthen" the armed forces "as soon as possible," with the president declaring a national emergency and establishing controls on prices, wages, and production.Truman agreed.He then ordered Acheson, Marshall, and Bradley to meet with the Joint Chiefs of Staff the next morning and report to him immediately thereafter.

For the Truman administration, the Korean War was now a face-saving operation.

China in the United Nations
At the same time, emissaries from the Chinese Communist Party also arrived at the United Nations headquarters in Lake Success, but Western attempts to deal with them were all in vain.Acheson said in a telegram to the U.S. diplomatic missions in the United Nations that the attitude of the Chinese "has no intention of compromise or reconciliation."Even attempts to talk to them from Beijing-friendly missions were "rejected," and the Chinese "cut off all ties with all delegations except those of the Soviet Union."The State Department wanted to put pressure on friendly governments to support a UN General Assembly resolution condemning China, in the spirit of a Security Council resolution vetoed by the Soviets.

It appears that Chinese representatives will not act without specific instructions from Beijing. Late at night on December 12, Indian representative Benegal Law finally met with China's General Wu Xiuquan (who Law called "a cool-headed soldier").Also present was a lesser "advisor" named Qiao Guanhua, who held a number of positions at China's foreign ministry, including director of the international information department.Lao believes that Joe is the "brain tank" of the Chinese delegation.Yes, Chinese may eat with Indians, but not within 1 hours. [Ernest Gross of the US delegation argued that Law was "pursuing (a) weak line of appeasement". ]
Gross met Law at a dinner that night.Law took him aside and said that the Chinese were ready to meet with the US at 10:30 the next morning.Gross advised the State Department: "Because Law often acts impulsively, I think it should be guarded." He believes that some of Law's enthusiasm is the result of "political immaturity."But he wanted to avoid "falling into a trap" that could create "false hope" "among UN members".Gross thus set out to teach Law that the Soviets often diverted the attention of the free world with "propaganda about wanting to 'discuss'" during negotiations, and he warned Law not to "fall into this well-known trap."Although the United States is "not in a hurry" to "talk" with General Wu, "if General Wu has any ideas, we are always ready to listen."

(End of this chapter)