The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 79
Behind the courteous diplomatic language lurks a message: America, wary and skeptical, is ready to receive whatever signal the Chinese want to send about ending the war.

washington panicked

James Reston of The New York Times insightfully summed up the mood in Washington on Sunday, December 12:
Today, every official movement in the capital, every official report from Tokyo, every well-informed personal assessment of the situation reflects a sense of urgency, even panic, about the situation of UN forces in North Korea .Even that fateful night when the Korean War broke out 23 weeks ago, the atmosphere was less gloomy.

对五角大楼来说，午夜过后不久来自东京的一份电报中严峻的记录是坏消息的开始。联合国部队在11月30日和12月1日有超过1.1万人阵亡、负伤、失踪或被俘。第2步兵师损失了超过6 380人，几乎是其兵力的一半。据信，土耳其旅的5 000人中，损失了1 000人。第8集团军和第10军在战场上的兵力加起来也不过是11万人，而据情报分析，中国人的兵力为25.6万人，北朝鲜人的兵力为1万人。

When people are comprehending this pessimistic news, MacArthur's depressing news seems to add insult to injury.The 10th Army is withdrawing to the Xingnan area "as fast as possible"; the situation of the 8th Army is "increasingly dangerous", and General Walker is now proposing not to be in Pyongyang, but to hold a front around Seoul.MacArthur believed that combining the two forces into one was useless (and "inoperable"), that both forces were "absolutely outnumbered" and that combining them would cause problems for the delivery of supplies from different logistical supply lines.

He also sees little benefit in building a line of defense across the waist of North Korea.The ground distance here is about 150 miles, which means that any one of the seven U.S. divisions will have to defend a front of 7 miles or more." night infiltration across rough and steep terrain".MacArthur believes that such a front without depth "has no strength, and as a defensive concept, it will also be penetrated, and the result is to be surrounded and annihilated or to be broken individually."The concept may work against the weaker North Koreans, "but it's impossible to deal with the strength of the Chinese army."

MacArthur went on to complain that Washington did not yet understand "the fundamental changes due to the overt entry of Chinese troops into the war."Twenty-six Chinese divisions were engaged, and "at least" another 26 troops were moving forward in the rear.The value of American air support was reduced by the terrain.With Chinese troops massed inland, naval artillery fire was ineffective.The Ministry of Defense repeatedly told MacArthur that he could no longer send troops, but MacArthur still demanded to "send ground reinforcements to the maximum extent", otherwise his troops would be forced to retreat steadily, "and each retreat will reduce resistance" until Forced to "beachhead defensive position".

MacArthur praised the morale and efficiency of his troops, although "it fought almost non-stop for five months" (it would be wrong to say that the war had been going on for five months, but most of the American divisions did not fight until 9 arrived in North Korea in the middle of the month, that is, two and a half months after the outbreak of the war).The combat effectiveness of South Korean troops was "negligible" and other foreign contingents were too small to make an impact.MacArthur wanted to greatly bolster the army and drastically change the rules with which he fought:
A comprehensive assessment of the situation here must be based on the viewpoint that this is a brand new war with a brand new power with a powerful military under completely new circumstances.

The operational order I executed was based on North Korean forces as an adversary.Due to new events, this directive is completely obsolete.The fact that our relatively small force is now facing the full offensive capabilities of China, a country made stronger by the Soviet Union's massive supplies, must be clearly understood.

The strategic thinking that was applied very successfully to the North Korean army in the past will not work well if it continues to be used against such a powerful country.

This requires a new formulation of feasible political decisions and strategic plans adequate to deal with the relevant realities.Time is important in this, because every hour the enemy grows in strength while ours weakens.

The Pentagon is pessimistic
At 9:30 a.m. Sunday morning, senior State and Defense officials met in the Pentagon to read MacArthur's report, in Acheson's words, "in an atmosphere of increasing heaviness."MacArthur's complaints comforted no one.General Matthew Ridgway, dismayed by the heavy blow to the U.S. Army, reported military developments.He is not optimistic, and he is not sure whether the 10th Army can disengage and reach Xingnan, and whether the 8th Army can reach Seoul before the Chinese.If the troops could reach the beachheads at Incheon, Hamhung, and Pusan, they would be able to hold their positions until a decision to retreat was made.

Acheson suddenly turned the discussion to the crucial question: "Has the military situation reached a point where we need to seek a ceasefire?"

Bradley replied that a ceasefire was "okay" if the cost wasn't too high. "Are we going to leave North Korea? Are they?" The military situation would improve if U.S. forces could reach the beachhead.The United States is rapidly losing the initiative. If a ceasefire cannot be reached through the United Nations within 48 hours, "do we have to conclude that we have to take action ourselves"?One approach Bradley suggested was to "tell the Chinese communists that we think we are at war because they refuse to cease fire." Use the atomic bomb".

Acheson was not as ready for a ceasefire as Bradley was.If the U.S. made such a request and was denied, it would spark a debate at the United Nations.The United States must take into account the security of its military, as well as its position in the Far East and "the world".Secretary of State does not expect to retreat anytime soon: "If we abandon the North Koreans and they are killed, we risk becoming the greatest appeasement pedophile ever. If a Dunkirk-style situation arises, we are forced to withdraw It would be a catastrophe, but it would not lose face." If the Chinese and Soviets made their conditions, "a retreat to the [-]th parallel seemed feasible" (although he was quick to add that it was "too easy ", he doubted whether the enemy would accept it).

As a diplomat, Acheson was reluctant to be drawn into negotiations on Taiwan because the United States lacked international support on the issue.He said other countries "don't think Taiwan belongs to us and don't sympathize with our position," but he was able to find "moral strength" to support a ceasefire at the [-]th parallel.The United States “must expect” someone—he mentions Clement Attlee here—to propose a cease-fire, in which case the State Department's role is to persuade other governments to "stand up for what is right and right" ".

General Bradley repeated that a ceasefire would be of military use "if the cost is not too great", but "the time is running out for this proposal and we must take that into account".

Acheson wished to "carefully consider" any action directed against the Chinese.If the ceasefire request is rejected, "and we have to fight our way out, all military steps against the Chinese should be linked to the withdrawal of our troops".He did not want "mere retaliation" because "if we had an all-out war with China, which would soon lead to an all-out war with the Soviets, we would be fighting without the support of our allies".

Chief of Naval Staff Sherman wanted no compromises.The United States has lost soldiers, "People can say that we have lost a battle, but we have not been defeated."He disagreed with the call for a ceasefire. "The only correct way to deal with the Chinese Communist Party is to tell them that if they don't stop, they are at war with the United States." If the Chinese choose war, "we will withdraw our troops as well as possible and go to war. If If we don't take that course, other people will bully us. If anyone can kill that many Americans without being at war, we're lost."

Bradley believes that the Chinese will not agree to a cease-fire solution.He believes that "the two sides are racing to seize the beachhead." The problem is not only how long the military can hold the beachhead, but also "how long can the American public tolerate this situation when we don't talk about war with China."

"We're at war with the wrong country, and that's a big problem," Acheson said. "We're at war with the second echelon, and the real enemy is the Soviet Union."

Bradley doesn't want to send soldiers to China, but he "doesn't know if we can go home and forget about it."

Acheson "of course" couldn't do it.He asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff how war with China would affect America's ability to fight the Soviet Union. "The Soviet Union would like to see us fight inextricably with the Chinese." If the resources of the United States are used for the war against China, "we will not be able to increase our power in Europe."

Acheson went on to say that another issue is the impact that going to war with China would have on US allies.He "thought many of them would leave us and deal with the Soviet Union".The French, Acheson said, were "extremely weak, shell-shocked, and eager to make a deal that would give them an illusion of security."

Discussion then turned to the question of possible security measures the United States might take if it decided to withdraw.Is censorship necessary?Acheson asked.

"It's very necessary, but it's difficult," Sherman said. "Maybe the best thing to do is get the reporters out of there."

Acheson recalled General William Sherman's policy during the Civil War: "Tell all his plans to the reporters, and then put them all in jail."

Acheson finally addressed the key question: If a certain country proposed a ceasefire at the [-]th parallel, and it was desirable, who in this room would have doubts about it?
No answers were heard and no objections were heard, according to Philip Jessup's minutes of the meeting.However, Bradley did express concern about "the reaction in Congress and the military."How much, he asked, could be given up without further action against China?He doubts that the Chinese will accept the [-]th Parallel, "we have crossed it before".

Bradley sees two issues: Politically, should the United States ask for a ceasefire.In military terms, "If we retreat to the beachhead, do we start withdrawing our troops; or fight until a Dunkirk-style retreat?" People can be withdrawn quickly from Incheon, but not quickly Out of equipment, "If we do it now, we can withdraw more things. The same is true of Busan, but Hungnam is a problem. It must be decided immediately whether we want to start the retreat."

Is gear critical?Acheson asked. "We don't have anything else," Bradley replied, "but you can't say they're critical."

"Should we withdraw the South Korean troops?" Acheson asked.

"We can't leave them behind if they want to get out," said Freeman Matthews of the State Department.

Marshall was back to the question of whether to start admitting total failure, which he didn't like due to "psychological factors".According to Marshall, "It would be useful politically if someone came up with a proposal for a cease-fire at the [-]th parallel before we got there. Once we had retreated to the beachhead, the Chinese Communists would be able to sweep South Korea."

Is the South Korean Army going to withdraw to Japan?Jessup asked.Rusk believes that this cannot be done. "The Communist Party is currently extremely active among the Koreans in Japan. It may be dangerous to introduce the South Korean army." It is necessary to find another place for the South Korean army to stay.

Bradley argued that other participants did not pay enough attention to the issue of the U.S. debacle and its consequences elsewhere. "If the Chinese attacking us in North Korea is not a war," he said, "is it a war when they take our territory in Berlin?" Platoons mean war." He didn't want American troops "to be swept away by the East Germans in Berlin" next.Bradley doubted that the United States would accept being forced to retreat and "don't hit back" at the Chinese.He does not want to go to war with China, "However, the impact of withdrawing or being driven out without going to war with China is very bad."However, he "will not propose retaliation until we withdraw completely".

Acheson, who wanted to deal with any ceasefire as legally as possible, described a diplomatic dilemma.American public opinion will not tolerate the government's proposed "ceasefire on any basis".The United States "cannot continue to fight the Chinese after the ceasefire, unless they violate the ceasefire agreement and re-attack, otherwise we are single-handedly launching a war against the order of the United Nations".If the U.S. must continue the war, "we cannot take the course of ending hostilities. We can only be forced to leave North Korea, so we must reject a cease-fire proposal. In that case, we must let the Chinese be blamed, and we must reject it." Put them on the hat of aggressors."

Acheson concluded the meeting by saying that the President wished to speak with Prime Minister Attlee before making any decisions, especially one that might lead to an all-out war with China.So what should MacArthur be ordered to do?Sherman urged that MacArthur should be ordered to transfer troops to the beachhead immediately. (As mentioned earlier, MacArthur mentioned in a telegram not long ago that retreating to the beachhead is also one of his several strategic options.)
During the meeting, Bradley kept scribbling.At this time, he read a draft order, asking MacArthur to "hold the beachhead as long as required, and wait for the whole situation to settle."

Marshall objected.He doubted the need to be so specific about the situation and its developments.He believed that it was enough to authorize the redeployment of the three bases (Incheon, Wonsan, and Hamhung-Hungnam) defended by the US military.

There was no vote on it, not even an informal show of hands, but the unanimity was clear: MacArthur's forces should be withdrawn to those seaports and prepared to withdraw for the first time in US military history without a win .

For Matthew Ridgway, the meeting was a harrowing experience.As a soldier, he was well aware of MacArthur's problem, that is, the general played tricks on military orders and acted arbitrarily.Ridgway sat there, amazed that his superiors talked about everything but MacArthur's problems.Although Acheson and Marshall participated in the meeting as representatives of the president, "it is obvious that no one is willing to issue a categorical order to the commander in the Far East to reverse the bad situation that is rapidly descending into disaster."Although there are people with "responsibility and authority" in this room, no one speaks.

(End of this chapter)