The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 80
In the end, Li Qiwei's conscience prevailed over caution, and he said "with emotion" that the participants "had spent too much time arguing, and we need to act now", otherwise we will lose to the soldiers on the battlefield, sitting on the staff The people in the long joint room must ultimately take responsibility for the lives of soldiers.There were 20 people present at the meeting, all of them were the highest officials of the US military, and Ridgway was answered by silence. (A naval admiral scribbled a note: "Proud of you.")
will be scattered.Ridgway was extremely frustrated, and he approached General Hoyt Vandenberg.When Ridgway taught at West Point, Vandenberg was a cadet there.Li Qiwei thought that there was no need to go around in circles. He later recalled:
I asked him, "Why didn't the chiefs of staff of the Joint Conference give MacArthur an order to tell him what to do?"

Vandenberg shook his head: "What's the use? He won't obey orders. What can we do?"

Hearing this, I lost my temper. "Any commander who disobeys orders, you can dismiss him, why not?" I asked loudly.

I will never forget the look on Vandenberg's face at that moment.He opened his mouth, looked at me in bewilderment and amazement, and walked away without another word.I never had an opportunity to discuss the matter with him again.

Immediately after the Pentagon meeting, Acheson, Marshall, and Bradley reported to Truman.According to Acheson's account, there were two possibilities: to continue the war operations against the Chinese; or to stop the fighting "before the defeat is too late" "to save our army."He apparently rejected the first possibility, since he never brought it up again.For him, the question now is how to retreat.

Acheson believes that three areas with different conditions should be considered in the retreat: the east coast, Incheon and Pusan.He said a retreat on the east coast "should only be considered to free troops" because there would be nothing politically to be gained by standing there. (This suggestion by Acheson is consistent with the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that MacArthur should withdraw the X Corps from its extremely exposed position at the Chosin Reservoir.) In terms of etiquette, Acheson always said melodious.He told Truman that he "didn't want to put it up as an opinion, because it's a purely military question. However, if the military does need some kind of political action, say, a cease-fire, to effect a retreat on the East Coast, then The military should have let us know."A decision on Incheon could wait a few more days, but Acheson suggested that if Eighth Army forces had to withdraw from this port to avoid encirclement, they should re-land and rest in Japan instead of going to Korea south.Acheson said that it would be "extremely terrible" to abandon South Korean soldiers far from their homeland, and that "some way or other way should be found for them to re-land in South Korea and then infiltrate their homeland". The thing is not to abandon them.

Acheson then raised the question of the price the United States "will have to pay" for what happened in North Korea.If the US proposes a cease-fire and it is accepted, "then we need to understand that we can't do something like bombing 'Manchuria', and we have to abide by it ourselves".On the other hand, "if we think that the request for a ceasefire may not be accepted, that's a different story". (Acheson's implication is that under such circumstances, the United States can bomb "Manchuria" as it pleases.)
The consensus was that Truman would wait until after his meeting with Clement Attlee to make a decision.Acheson "inclines to think that we should not do it alone, and can only do so."

Finally, Bradley got Truman to agree to send MacArthur a telegram ordering him to gather the troops.The telegram was sent in the late afternoon."We consider it a top priority to preserve your department's strength. Agree to concentrate forces on a few beachheads," the order said.

As Acheson finally went to bed that Sunday night, he thought he would not be surprised if he was awakened by news of a global war.

The chiefs of staff of the Joint Conference shared Acheson's concerns. On December 12, the Chinese occupied Pyongyang and continued to pursue the battered Eighth Army.On the same day, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a stern warning to all US military commanders around the world: "The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the current situation in North Korea has greatly increased the possibility of an all-out war. Commanders (should) take feasible actions to stay on top without creating an atmosphere of panic."

The Pentagon meeting also frustrated Dean Rusk.Back at the State Department, he expressed concern about the morale of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who "all looked downcast."He believes that the military "is not in a state of mind that is doing our best work in North Korea."

The problem may lie in MacArthur's performance on the battlefield.Rusk suggested using a secret trick to get rid of the general. General Lawton Collins will leave the Joint Chiefs of Staff and go to North Korea to command the troops. MacArthur will be demoted and "study the peace treaty with Japan all the time."Such a titular arrangement would be a public disparagement of MacArthur, for which the General would not be silently humiliated.Talk of firing a field commander had nothing to do with State Department business, and Rusk apparently knew that, because the meeting memo quickly skipped over his suggestion and didn't indicate that it would be discussed later.

George Kennan didn't like the idea of ​​negotiations.Demanding a ceasefire would be seen by the Soviets as "begging for peace" and they would "intend to seize all possible advantages and to damage the reputation of the United States everywhere they could...their response would inevitably be insolent".If the theory of negotiating on the basis of strength holds true, "then this is clearly a very bad time to deal with the Russians."

But the immediate priority is "an accurate analysis of the military's ability to resist it."Rusk said: "If we cannot achieve a ceasefire at the [-]th parallel, we must stop at the best position." If a ceasefire cannot be achieved, the United States must hold its position as long as possible and force the Chinese to artificially drive out the United Nations. Pay as much as possible.An easy "bow and quit" would have disastrous consequences for America's standing in the world.

Later that morning, Acheson reported the results of these discussions to General Marshall by telephone.Marshall agreed with reservations: First, it was necessary to see if the Tenth Army could withdraw; second, the United States "must not be in a cocoon."Acheson agreed.

But just as State Department diplomats were urging UN troops to stop retreating and fight, senior Pentagon civilians were doing the opposite.The proposals made by the service ministers to Marshall were diametrically opposed to those of Acheson.If the United Nations forces are pushed south of the [-]th parallel, they should withdraw from North Korea.However, the United States should deny defeat, blockade China afterward, and prepare to bomb Chinese lines of communication, while being careful not to commit ground forces in mainland China. "The basis of our policy," they wrote, "should not be the acceptance of military defeat at present as the defeat of a battle or campaign." But they emphasized that retaliations already proposed could only be carried out with the consent of the United Nations .Marshall knew that this latter rider rendered the Ministers' proposal meaningless.The problem for the United States is to convince the majority of the United Nations not to expand the war, but to continue to fight, regardless of the number of troops.

American newspapers carried "situation maps" on their front pages every day, showing that the Chinese were outflanking the Tenth Army and encircling the Eighth Army in a pincer offensive. "This is the worst military failure of the United States since Pearl Harbor," said Newsweek, "and it may go down as the worst military defeat in American history. Barring a military or diplomatic miracle, the North Korean About two-thirds of the U.S. Army may have to engage in a new Dunkirk-style retreat to save them from a new Bataan-style demise." That same week, Time lamented: " It's a failure, the worst failure America has ever suffered." Time also implicitly called on the Truman administration to take tougher action (but didn't make any specific recommendations about what to do anyway):

Tolerating this failure would have meant losing Asia to communism.If this failure is tolerated, no country in Asia will trust the promise that once gave them anticommunist hope that the United States and its allies will stand by them.Also, Europeans would never believe that America was the bulwark against communism, but that was what it boasted before the Korean catastrophe.

The adverse news on the battlefield produced a de facto shock among the American public that, surprisingly, did not affect the daily lives of large segments of the public.People are still scrambling to get to the weekend's popular college football game and packing department stores for Christmas shopping. A survey of Time magazine reporters found that the most frequently heard comment was: "It doesn't look good." A veteran wounded in World War II said, "I didn't turn on the radio— I don't want to hear bad news." MacArthur's "going home for Christmas" statement (to MacArthur's loyal "Time" magazine said that this was "misinterpreted" by the media, but this statement is not accurate) made the public Furious, for the sudden turn of events had taken them by surprise.A fueler at a gas station in Iowa criticized the government for not being tough enough: "They say one thing and another, who knows what they're thinking!"

Although the government has been careful not to blame the Soviets for starting the war, many Americans blame the Russians. "Shoot the culprit, the Bolshevik," said Zacharias Cosmas, a Detroit salesman, "hit a snake seven inches, and the tail will be useless." New Orleans policeman Ernest Curtis said: " We should declare war on Russia and drop all our atomic bombs there."

Time magazine found that the general public's attitude was one of bewilderment and a "dumb face with reality" that a person might have when told they had terminal cancer.

british visit

Dean Acheson hated Prime Minister Clement Attlee.On the eve of Attlee's arrival in Washington, Acheson recalled with amusement that Winston Churchill had described Attlee as "a wolf in sheep's clothing."The talks, which began on December 12 and went on for four days, were not surprising, with the two countries considered allies at loggerheads.

At the beginning of the talks, Attlee said that the United Nations had no choice but to withdraw from North Korea through negotiations, and even gave up Taiwan and gave Beijing the seat of China in the United Nations.The fact that the event was "serious and deeply unsavory" and would cause the United Nations "a disgrace ... especially in the Far East" did not embarrass Attlee: "The British are in [our] history We had to face difficult situations. . . . We cannot be cornered in the East and let ourselves be attacked in the West." Acheson quoted Attlee in his memoirs, saying that Attlee went on to say , there is nothing more important than maintaining Asia's "good opinion of us" (a phrase that is absent from the official transcript of the talks).Acheson recalled: "I say with all due respect that the security of the United States is more important."

Truman recounted the American position.A ceasefire is acceptable, but only if it does not mean abandoning South Korea or Taiwan, or giving China a seat in the United Nations.If China refuses the ceasefire and continues to fight, the United States will engage in various military, political and economic harassment activities, including inciting anti-communist guerrilla warfare in China.Attlee never said a word.The meeting ended in an uneasy atmosphere, with clearly dangerously sharp differences between the US and the UK.

That evening, Acheson approached the British ambassador, Sir Oliver Franks, at a reception and gave him a blunt warning.The United States must pursue a consistent foreign policy in both parts of the world, "If we surrender in the Far East, and especially because of the actions of our allies, American public opinion will be against the United States helping those countries that are about to collapse in the West."Acheson said.If the U.S. leaves North Korea voluntarily, "the Filipinos and Japanese will find another backer."

Acheson proposed a way out of the predicament: a simple cease-fire proposal in the UN General Assembly, which the United States could easily pass. "It is very likely that the Chinese will not accept a ceasefire, and other countries will therefore press us to make an offer. We will ignore this view." If the United States is forced to "conduct a Dunkirk-style retreat," it will at least "prove We are not prepared to surrender, but to stand up to the attack. It is much easier to hold on to this course than to flee and surrender."Under no circumstances would Acheson "reward" the Chinese for interfering in Korea.

Acheson's outspokenness paid off.The next day, the morning of December 12, Franks told him that the British would support the ceasefire proposal.Acheson expressed his gratitude, but disagreed with the proposal to invite the Chinese to participate in the UN General Assembly debate.

When Truman and Attlee met again that day, the president emphasized that the United States would not automatically leave North Korea, even if United Nations forces were in danger of being bombed.Truman was "unwilling to get into this situation and then admit that we are defeated", preferring to "fight to the end".The President said clearly to Attlee: "We will not abandon our friends in times of crisis."

In later talks, Attlee brought up what he called "the difficult and ... delicate issue" of MacArthur's command of the war."The prevailing view in Europe was that ... MacArthur was running everything, and they felt that the other belligerents had little say in the matter," the prime minister said.

General Bradley and Secretary of Defense Marshall vigorously defended MacArthur.MacArthur was acting on the commission of the United Nations, and the British often provided advice on military issues.Bradley expressed outrage at the suggestion that a committee should set war policy.If the British, or anyone else, didn't like what was happening, "then they can speak up and they'll be helped in the retreat".

During the remainder of the meeting, the two sides debated the appropriate way to bring China and the West back together.The British demanded a policy of softness, and the Americans took the position that (in the words of State Department George Kennan) "we owe China nothing but to teach it a lesson."Ultimately, Truman hoped, "they will realize that their friends are not in Siberia, but in London and Washington."

Attlee believes that "our continued military operations against them cannot make them realize this".Truman "deeply agrees, but we cannot leave the North Koreans to be slaughtered."The president offered an analogy: "It would be one thing if they beat us in North Korea; but Britain didn't surrender after Dunkirk and kept fighting.  … Maybe we have inherited the spirit of the United Kingdom in America : Don’t like provocation, but stand up to fight when war comes.”

The main motivation for Attlee's trip was to focus on the use of nuclear weapons, but the debate between the two sides over the policy of total war made the topic trivial.In the final hours of the meeting, Truman and Attlee finally discussed the issue in private, without any aides present.Truman told Attlee that the United States and the United Kingdom had "always been partners in this matter, and he would not consider the use of the atomic bomb until he had consulted with the United Kingdom."Then Prime Minister Attlee unwisely demanded that the agreement be put into writing.

(End of this chapter)