The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 81
"No," said Truman sharply, "it can't be written. If a man doesn't believe what he says, it won't do any good."

As Truman and Attlee announced their decision that the United States and Britain should consult before the use of the atomic bomb, Acheson and Robert Lovett of the Department of Defense exchanged painful glances.U.S. law forbade the president from making any such promises; moreover, Truman had repeatedly promised that he alone would decide when the use of the atomic bomb was necessary. "We're going to be in big trouble, and you've got to get the ball," Lovett whispered to Acheson.

Acheson and the president whispered a few words.Shared responsibility for the use of the atomic bomb, which would provoke a "severe attack" on the government and Britain in Parliament.Acheson said it was preferable to make a commitment to Attlee to maintain contact with him in any situation that might lead to a world war.

Attlee left convinced that Truman had no plans to use nuclear weapons in North Korea.But what he didn't know was that during the talks, Truman had ordered the dismantled nuclear bomb parts to be flown to the Far East and stored on an American aircraft carrier.Truman did not intend to use atomic bombs, but he was ready and willing to order them dropped if necessary to prevent a military catastrophe for the United States.

Is it a six month war?

Of all the talks, the most uncertain element was the lack of specific understanding of the extent of the Chinese intentions.In retrospect, it is clear that the purpose of the Chinese "first campaign" was to warn the UN forces away. The "Second Campaign" panicked MacArthur's troops, but its purpose remains unknown.A highly classified report sent to the White House by the CIA on December 12 did offer some clues.The content of the report, which was heavily redacted after it was downgraded under the Freedom of Information Act, suggests that it came from a credible foreign source.According to the report:
The CCP believes that the use of atomic bombs in North Korea to tactically support the United Nations forces will not lead to war, but a strategic atomic attack on the hinterland of "Manchuria" is another matter.In that case, the decision to go to war would be made by Soviet Russia.

However, sources report that Communist officials "believe with absolute certainty" that the UN forces will not use atomic bombs.Moreover, if the United Nations forces are driven back to the [-]th parallel, they will either withdraw from North Korea, or they will reach an agreement with the Chinese.

According to a CIA source, the Soviets "apparently convinced China that the United States would not be able to fight a war for the next six months and that a solution to the Korean problem must be achieved at that stage."The Chinese were said to be concerned "with their best-trained and best-equipped troops tethered to the Northeast and North, and the Chinese agreed to intervene in the Korean War after the Soviet Union had made a promise that if China were at war with the United States, The Soviet Union will provide 30 Soviet troops, naval and air support."

The CIA report arrived in Washington less than 72 hours after Truman told Prime Minister Attlee bluntly that the United States did not intend to use nuclear weapons in North Korea.Among those in the British embassy who attended the Truman and Attlee talks were Soviet spies Philby and Burgess.Reports of the talks went straight to the U.S. Department of the British Foreign Office, which was headed by another Soviet agent, MacLean.

In the words and discourses in Washington up and down, there is an extreme distrust of the accuracy of MacArthur's field reports.MacArthur wavered and changed every day.He would exclaim that his troops were doomed and demand reinforcements and the authority to expand the bombing in order to keep the situation under control.Then he would quibble with reporters' reports that his troops were "in retreat" rather than in an orderly retreat.As mentioned, one of the results was Washington's decision on December 12 to send General Collins to the Far East.Field commanders under MacArthur had no direct connection to the Ministry of Defense, and cables were censored by Tokyo, and if MacArthur or his subordinates didn't like them, they would rewrite or discard them.However, even MacArthur did not dare to try to prevent the Army Chief of Staff from visiting the front-line generals.

General Bradley presented a wide range of possibilities for Collins to discuss with MacArthur, including a possible naval and air attack north of the Yalu River.The first draft of the drafted order asked Collins to consider the pros and cons of arranging a ceasefire.However, Bradley felt it was inappropriate to bring this defeatist choice to field commanders, so he ticked off the sentence.He mainly wanted Collins to find out the exact situation in the Far East.

Collins flew to Tokyo on December 12 and spoke with MacArthur for about four hours, but all he heard was the same cliché that had been in MacArthur's Daily Telegram for the past week: that the United Nations should "go all out" to meet the Chinese challenge ; "Instructions and strategic planning" should be changed accordingly, that is to say, MacArthur can lead the war to China as he pleases.MacArthur claimed that he faced an army of more than half a million Chinese and more than 4 North Koreans, a mass capable of surrounding any fixed defensive position and forcing the Eighth Army back into the Seoul-Incheon area.His forces could hold the beachhead only if the Chinese did not launch an all-out offensive.

Are there any reinforcements in place, or are there likely to be?He posed to Collins the question that had been answered time and time again.No, Collins replied.

For MacArthur, therefore, the only solution was to arrange a ceasefire as soon as possible "according to the (best) conditions available".Although MacArthur never allowed himself to say this outright—his arrogance did not allow him to admit defeat, but always blamed external causes for failure—his meaning was clear: the troops under his command could not be defeated in North Korea. Stand and hold a line.Unless Washington meets his needs, he is ready to withdraw from the fight.

Collins hoped that the enemy would give the UN forces a break.He said the Joint Chiefs of Staff "may intend" to order the Eighth Army to withdraw to Japan and then regroup.

He sent a cable to the Joint Chiefs of Staff outlining MacArthur's views, and then flew to North Korea for direct talks with field commanders.He had every reason to expect to see a battered army, powerless against the Chinese, forced to withdraw quickly from the peninsula and humiliated by it, for that was what MacArthur had been sending to Washington in the past few days The main content of the telegram.

Collins worked around the clock.He was in Seoul for talks with Walker just three hours or so after his meeting with MacArthur.Walker does have difficulties, and he admits they are.The 2nd Division was "badly damaged", that is, almost wiped out, just like the Turkish brigade.But the situation was by no means hopeless, as Walker had had several days to redeploy his forces and assess losses.The 1st Cavalry Division and the 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions are in very good condition.The ROK 5th Division is doing just fine, although other ROK units will have to withdraw from the fight to rest.Walker didn't think he could hold Pyongyang, and he feared the Chinese would drive right into the gap between his 8th and 10th armies.If the 8th Army tried to hold out in the Seoul-Incheon area, it would most likely be encircled.He did not wish to be forced to retreat by Incheon, for he feared that it would cost a great deal of men and equipment. "On the other hand," said Collins, "he will be able to withdraw to Pusan ​​without further serious losses, and if he is reinforced by Tenth Corps, he will be able to hold the original Pusan ​​perimeter indefinitely."

This is the situation of half of MacArthur's troops on the battlefield.If necessary, Walker is ready to live and die with the position again, as he did in the summer.Collins came to the conclusion after spending another day on the battlefield: "Although the situation of the Eighth Army is not good, it is not panicked." Use atomic weapons. "From what I saw yesterday, atomic weapons will certainly not be used," he replied.Would the 8th Army be surrounded by the Chinese moving south along its right flank, the "Gap of the 12th Army"?Collins replied: "I think the Eighth Army can take care of itself."

Collins then flew to Xingnan to meet with General Almond, commander of the 10th Army.Things are mixed here, too.The 7th Infantry Division and the 3rd Division also suffered losses, but the 1st Marine Division, the mainstay of the UN forces fighting in eastern Korea, was retreating from the Jangjin Reservoir relatively unscathed. "General Almond is convinced, and I agree," Collins told the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "that he can hold the Xingnan bridgehead for a considerable period of time without suffering serious losses. And if necessary, He was able to successfully evacuate the bridgehead by sea and air without excessive loss of personnel and equipment."

In this way, a second field commander raised tit-for-tat objections to MacArthur's battlefield assessment.MacArthur apparently did not realize the capabilities of his own troops, and he was deeply involved in political schemes.He demanded that the war be directed to China, using Chinese Nationalist forces, and blamed Britain and the rest of Europe for his troubles, so that he neglected the first duty of a commander: to do as best he could as he could task without picking on the command aspect.

Collins was less senior and prestigious than MacArthur, but his visits to the front—MacArthur had not been there since launching his “offensive to end the war” on November 11—convinced him that the general was either right Knowing nothing of what was happening in his theater, he was either counting on expanding the war to further his grand designs or to save his troops from total annihilation.

In a sense, Collins' inspection was a turning point in MacArthur's fate.For months, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been skeptical of MacArthur's meddling in government affairs, his publicly arrogant statements, and his strategic maneuvers.Now, Collins is going to add another crime to MacArthur: MacArthur failed tactically and did not understand his own battlefield situation.

On December 12, Collins met again with MacArthur and his senior staff in Tokyo.Collins proposed three scenarios as the framework for the discussion, the first two scenarios assumed that the Chinese continued to attack with all their strength, and the third scenario assumed that the Chinese agreed not to cross the 7th parallel and enter the South.

In the first scenario, the assumed premise is that the United Nations will not take air action against China; that there will be no naval blockade; that there will be no reinforcements with Chinese Nationalist troops; and that there will be no increase in United Nations ground forces, except for the possibility of mobilization in April 1951 Four National Guard divisions; and the non-use of the atomic bomb.

MacArthur "felt strongly" that if he were bound by all or most of these conditions, while the Chinese continued their onslaught, "it would essentially amount to surrender."A ceasefire is a political thing, "it will help, but it is not essential from a military point of view".U.S. troops will have to withdraw from North Korea, "but we should not rush to find a ceasefire."MacArthur did agree with his field commanders (according to Collins' report) that the 8th and 10th armies could safely retreat regardless of the ceasefire.

(End of this chapter)