The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 86
At the end, MacArthur challenged Washington to decide whether to stay in North Korea or not.In his telegram, he said the decision --

Of the highest national and international importance, far beyond the competence of a theater commander who is largely at the mercy of occasional events that affect only the tactical situation in a very limited area of ​​operations.Nor is this a matter that should depend on the initiative of the enemy.According to a reasonable interpretation of your electricity, the enemy's initiative actually becomes a decisive measure.My question, therefore, is this: What is the goal of current U.S. policy, is to maintain a military presence in North Korea for an unspecified, limited period of time, or to retreat as soon as it is possible to minimize losses?
As mentioned earlier, our army has been subjected to extraordinary restrictions in North Korea and has been forced to face various difficulties in securing its military status in North Korea.But it can hold out for a certain period of time until its entire army is wiped out, if overriding political considerations so require (emphasis added by citer).

President Truman was "deeply troubled" when General Marshall brought MacArthur's telegram to the White House, and MacArthur was in effect accusing "the impossibility of the course of action determined by the National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by me."Dean Acheson put it more sharply. "This is a document for posterity, if there ever was such a document," he declared. pressure, let him change his mind, and instead accept his proposal to expand the war..." In Acheson's view, "Without any proof, I fully believe that this rebellious general is incurable, and he will always The Commander's intentions were largely disloyal."Secretary of Defense Marshall told Dean Rusk after reading the passage on troop morale: "The day a general complains about the morale of his troops is the day he should check his own."

MacArthur's dark assessment of the military situation puzzled the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who believed that Ridgway's performance in the first week of January had shown that the Eighth Army could hold out.Admiral Sherman said he and his colleagues were "somewhat annoyed" by being asked to "clarify" an already clear directive.When the telegram arrived, General Marshall told a Senate committee a few months later, "we were at our lowest point."But General Collins sympathized with MacArthur's dilemma and expressed some dissatisfaction with the State Department.In a series of regular meetings following China's intervention, "the chiefs of staff have been trying to define ... what are our future political goals in North Korea," and diplomats have been "responding to the question: 'Your What about military capabilities?'" In Collins' view, "this discussion almost inevitably leads to the age-old question of 'which came first, the chicken or the egg'".Collins believes that the State Department hopes to maximize military achievements, "and once things go wrong, the military has to bear full responsibility."

Despite Truman's exasperation, he agreed that (MacArthur) sent the telegram "in order to express his concerns and to ask that his request be reconsidered."

On Sunday, January 1, Dean Acheson invited key State Department and Pentagon officials to his home for an informal meeting.Acheson was very annoyed, and it was beyond words.He and other officials had spent days last month striking an agreement that the military would give the diplomacy some time to do its work, and now MacArthur is raising the same issue again.Acheson could bear it no longer.He wanted someone else's opinion on how to convince MacArthur once and for all that the United States was taking a concrete course and that the general's endless carping was unwelcome.

But Acheson also knew he was speaking not as a soldier but as a diplomat, and with a keen sense of proportion, he tried to convince the military that he was not trying to interfere in military territory.He talked at length about the political importance of continuing military resistance.He agreed that it was up to military considerations to determine how long UN troops should continue to fight, and agreed that no demands should be made on Eighth Army that would compromise its future role in Japan.But he said "gaining time will be valuable." If the U.N. forces can hold out before a new ceasefire is under way, it may persuade the U.N. to condemn it even if it fails. China is the aggressor.

After more discussion and consideration of the various drafts at the White House and elsewhere, President Truman decided to use three separate avenues to bring MacArthur into compliance.

First, he approved a cable from the Joint Chiefs of Staff reiterating (for the third time) his directive to MacArthur to act: "Based on all factors known to us, including in particular the circumstances ", the Joint Chiefs of Staff said it was "not advisable" to remain in North Korea for a longer period of time "under current conditions," but further buying time for diplomatic efforts would be in the interests of the United States and the United Nations.Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff emphasized two points: "inflict the maximum practical punishment on the enemy" and not withdraw from North Korea "unless it is really forced by military considerations."

Second, Truman approved the sending of Generals Collins and Vandenberg to North Korea to obtain first-hand information on the current fighting situation (Acheson said "this is to expose MacArthur's rhetoric") and to make a decision on Washington The reason was discussed with MacArthur.Truman wanted to make his case by speaking directly to General MacArthur without the bureaucracy of a telegram exchange.

While the two generals were on their way to Tokyo, Truman drafted a personal letter to MacArthur.The president has always believed that if the general understood the rationale for American foreign policy, he would stop criticizing him.Truman heard some rumors that MacArthur's left and right attendants intercepted some of his telegrams, and many important documents never reached his desk.So Truman sent MacArthur a lengthy "private telegram" on January 1 to keep him "in keeping up with our country's foreign policy."

The cable summarizes what has been articulated at the National Security Council and other meetings over the past few months: "Successful resistance in North Korea" will show that neither the United States nor the United Nations will accept aggression; it will "combat China’s dangerously inflated political and military prestige”; it would buy time to organize the world against communist expansion.Truman asked MacArthur to make a judgment on "the best effort his troops could reasonably be expected to provide."

Truman went on to say that an extremely important goal was to "unify ... those countries that we desperately need to be allies should the Soviet Union attack us."Before military strength has been established, "our actions must be extremely cautious when it comes to issues involving the expansion of the theater of war."Truman could understand MacArthur's impatience, but "certain steps may be perfectly reasonable in themselves, and may help the Korean war, but they will not help if Japan and Western Europe are also involved in a large-scale conflict. benefit."

Truman acknowledged that continued resistance with existing forces might not be possible, and that U.S. strategic planning depended on preserving sufficient military strength to defend Japan.If the UN forces were driven out of Korea, it might be desirable for MacArthur to continue the resistance from Jeju or other islands.But it must be shown to the world that any withdrawal from North Korea is a consequence of "military necessity" that "we should not accept politically and militarily until the aggression is corrected."

This last sentence indicated that Truman intended to retaliate against the Chinese if MacArthur was forced to withdraw from Korea.However, the general never seemed willing to accept or believe this.

As it happened, MacArthur received Truman's telegram shortly before Collins and Vandenberg arrived in Tokyo.At the beginning of their conversation, MacArthur complained that no one had ever made it clear to him under what conditions and for how long the Eighth Army should hold on to North Korea, and who would be responsible for Japan's security.He then read the president's telegram, which he said cleared some of the doubts. "Gentlemen," he said, "that finally settles the question of whether we will withdraw from Korea—we will not." His reply to Truman was simple: "We will do what we can."

However, MacArthur was still timid about taking responsibility for North Korea and Japan at the same time, and the Eighth Army fought hard in North Korea.Collins told him to follow a Jan. 8 directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff that emphasized the importance of holding North Korea while leaving MacArthur to decide whether the United Nations could do so without being destroyed.Collins noted that the president has pointed to the critical importance of prolonging the resistance in North Korea to buy time for political action at the United Nations.As for the issue of Japan, even if the reinforcements were approved immediately, the reinforcements would not be able to reach Japan within six weeks. That is to say, MacArthur was still responsible for defending Japan.

MacArthur was not relieved by this.He replied "with some emotion" (in the words of General Collins) that it was not his responsibility to defend Japan while the Eighth Army was in Korea.He reiterated his plea for the immediate dispatch of four National Guard divisions to Japan.Collins and Vandenberg replied that the National Guard had not yet been mobilized for such purposes.

Collins and Vandenberg then turned to a lengthy document of options for action that had been gradually revised by Joint Chiefs of Staff officials since November.Its final draft was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and reviewed by Secretary of Defense Marshall, though not approved by him or anyone else.It was a list of various "suggested actions" to be taken against China when United Nations forces were forced to withdraw from North Korea.In the words of General Marshall, these proposals "are expedient measures to be implemented as soon as these possibilities are about to become a reality."Evacuation was at the top of the list originally presented on January 11.But when the list reached MacArthur, as Marshall pointed out, "the situation ... began to show signs of improvement."Marshall emphasized: "These proposed courses of action have not been vetoed or disagreed with by me, or by any other higher authority. Most of these actions are considered undesirable in view of the drastic changes in the circumstances which originally produced them." .”

Of the 16 points listed in the proposal, 11 are directly related to North Korea.But of the four specific demands MacArthur made in December (in the telegram that irritated the Joint Chiefs of Staff), only one was adopted without reservation, and that was the removal of restrictions on Nationalist troops. item.The other two, the naval blockade and bombing of the mainland, were obviously carefully placed just in case.MacArthur's fourth demand, the use of Nationalist troops in North Korea, was not even discussed, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not intend to repeat the old story.The key points listed are as follows:
- Continue and strengthen the economic and trade blockade against China.

- "Prepare now for a naval blockade of China and implement it as soon as our position in North Korea is secure, or when we have withdrawn from North Korea, depending on the circumstances."

- Removal of restrictions on aerial reconnaissance in the coastal areas of China and "Manchuria".

- Remove restrictions on the movement of the Chinese Nationalists and provide logistical support for their actions against the CCP, including providing "all feasible covert assistance" to the Nationalist guerrilla forces in China.

-- When the Chinese attack United Nations forces outside of North Korea, that is, to launch destructive sea and air strikes against Chinese targets.

The exact circumstances of Collins and Vandenberg's January 1 "options" to MacArthur are not recorded because their meeting was not recorded.Later in some Senate hearings in 12, the two generals insisted that they informed MacArthur that the January 1951 list was not an adopted plan of action, but rather options, should the Chinese drive his troops out of North Korea It can be considered by MacArthur.This is clearly a communication problem.In MacArthur's view, this list is equivalent to the scope of policy within which he can act (and comment).Either Collins or Vandenberg failed to adequately explain the difference between "suggested action" and "intentional action," or MacArthur failed to understand what they meant.A few months later, the January 1 list became a matter of constant political debate.MacArthur cited various articles of it as evidence that he did not violate policy by publicly discussing the list, while the administration and the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued against it.

Truman had used three channels to inform MacArthur why he was going to continue his operations in North Korea.Whether MacArthur heard, understood, or took what was told him seriously will only be known by waiting for the development of the situation.

The 8th Army is in action again

By the end of January, General Matthew Ridgway was ready to put Eighth Army into action again at any time.At this time, the 1th Army had been incorporated under the Joint Command of the 8th Army, and it went north to meet the enemy from the Busan area, and was again deployed in the east of the country.Several strategic considerations led Ridgway to decide to attack.Winter will be over soon.Before long, torrential spring rains will sweep across North Korea, washing away bridges, culverts and roads, and turning the lowlands and rice fields into a sea.Bad weather meant that the United States was unable to provide air support.In addition, Li Qiwei also wanted to know the whereabouts and movements of the CCP troops.Intelligence estimated that a Chinese force of 10 men was facing his position, but aerial reconnaissance revealed no sign of it.In the end, Li Qiwei flew 8 miles into the Chinese army's battle line.He took a very slow AT-17.4 advanced trainer plane, personally piloted by General Earl Partridge, commander of the 20th Air Force, to search for traces of the Chinese.Airplanes skim the trees, often descending below the surrounding ridges. "It was rare for us to spot a living creature," Ridgway wrote, "and no bonfire smoke, no wheel marks, or even trampled snow to indicate the presence of large numbers of troops." Thus, the Eighth Army could only Take a risk and find out the truth.

The 8th Army was more cautious in its operation this time, and did not repeat what MacArthur carried out in November last year, which Ridgway called "the reckless and uncoordinated advance into the Yalu River".Li Qiwei is in charge of the entire army, and the various armies are closely coordinated to take care of each other's flanks. When the offensive began on January 11, Ridgway was proud that the 1th Army "will soon prove that it will become what I have already predicted, the most valiant field army that our country has ever created."

(End of this chapter)