The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 85
Four days later, Almond inspected the 2nd Division defense area again.This time he found soldiers without gloves, sleeping bags, parkas or greatcoats; foxholes and emplacements were poorly constructed; It is suggested, but not stated in the report, that North Korean or Chinese troops use this village as their sanctuary).Almond called in artillery fire on a target from an observation post, and the first shells came 12 minutes later. "Too slow," he said.Almond checked around.The soldiers' anti-tank rocket launchers never fired, and a team of 57mm gunners "cannot hit a target within 700 yards of a target 300 yards away".

The next day, Ridgway dismissed General McClure with a sarcasm that sounded more like a warning to the man than a recommendation: "I believe that General McClure's distinguished The long track record will bear out the assumption that he will have a bright future in a number of other roles."

Ridgway did not need any investigative reports when he removed the other four generals (David Barr of the 7th, John Church of the 24th, Hobart Gay of the 1st Cavalry and 25th Division's William Keene), he had decided to replace them before leaving Washington.On January 1, Ridgway wisely said at a meeting of senior aides: "We must send some people with combat experience back to the battlefield. We will take away some people who have been in the war for a long time and send some young and vigorous generals over." Pentagon While supporting Ridgway, he advised him to proceed carefully so as not to provoke any congressional investigation into what General Wade Hayslip, the Army's deputy chief of staff, called the "massive removal of senior officers."Hayslip asked Ridgway to describe the withdrawal as a routine rotation and to have a press release issued by the War Department in Washington, not from the field.Haislip also advises: "Emphasis on their military exploits and awards in North Korea." These PR tricks have worked, as Time magazine managed to make a dismissal sound like a promotion, saying The generals who have been replaced "will return to the United States to assume the most important positions."By the end of February, Li Qiwei had mobilized a group of new backbones at the division level. They were all major generals, ranging in age from 8 to 2 years old.They are: Charles Palmer - 49st Cavalry Division; Blackshire Bryan Jr. - 51th Division; Claude Ferenbo - 1th Division; Joseph Bradley - 24st 7 divisions.

In a letter to Collins, Ridgway euphemistically compared the fortitude of American troops on the battlefield to those of Communist troops, admitting:
Unless you've seen the terrain in person from a jeep rather than from the air, it's hard to imagine the difficulty of maneuvering.But others can overcome this difficulty. They never seem to be short of ammunition, and ammunition is the heaviest material in their logistics line.Of course they used admirable strength and various means of transporting the earth - oxen, camels, mules and carts.

Li Qiwei hopes to "strengthen mental and physical strength" during training.When he visited a prisoner-of-war camp in Busan, he found that the North Korean and Chinese prisoners held there "looked little better than beasts in clothes. The Soviets were the ones who used such barbarians to destroy us while preserving their strength."

Li Qiwei intends to show no mercy to the enemies who use civilians as cover.At a headquarters meeting on Jan. 1, the question of what to do with enemy soldiers dressed as civilians was raised.The minutes of the meeting said: "We cannot execute them, but we must kill them before they become prisoners of war." A general suggested: "Just hand them over to the Korean side, and they will deal with it." Ridgway asked MacArthur for permission to use poison gas , "As a last resort in covering retreats and withdrawals from the final beachheads where we may be under extreme pressure, resorting to extreme measures is justified", using poison gas "would bring immeasurable tactical value".MacArthur refused, "I do not believe that once the withdrawal is ordered there will be an opportunity to use chemical weapons against the enemy. As you know, the United States completely and strictly prohibits the use of such substances. Even if our own government changes this attitude...  Nor can the United Nations" approve it.

Soldiers and officers soon learned that Ridgway was a meticulous man.He'd stop a Marine Corps radioman who couldn't bend down to tie loose bootlaces on his combat boots because of his comms gear, and Ridgway would do it himself.He emphasized the need to study the terrain: "We have to know how good the roads are, and we have to know where the armor can and cannot go." Weapons, ammunition, and provisions climbed the 2-foot ridge, and whether they could carry heavy equipment in, if they could ford the stream, or if they could find a road for wheeled vehicles."He and his pilot, Capt. Mike Lynch, flew all over the front, their L-000 liaison planes landing on roads atop rice paddy ridges or swooping into small towns to land on flat streets. “General Ridgway was like a cat on a hot tin roof in relation to the battle,” Lynch recounted. “He wanted to be there.”

Lynch is a bold and brave pilot, he can send Ridgway to where the general wants to go.He already knew how to scout irregular landing sites at his spare time for emergency use.He found a small town near the Han River, and a fairly wide road ran through it until it terminated at a T-shaped intersection. "The first time I flew under the wires into this town, then pulled up, flew over a bridge, and flew down again." Lynch said, "Four months later, I flew the plane for Ridgway. He had a plan of action , the 187th was to leap north of the town. But as part of the plan of action, the 1st Cavalry Division had quickly broken through the blocking enemy and appeared to be able to overtake the 187th to reach the objective. General Ridgway wondered where we should be Cancel the Leap Forward of the 187th Regiment, because if the Chinese are already out of town, it will be superfluous.” But are the Chinese in town?
"Let's go down and have a look." Li Qiwei said to Lynch.

An aide to Ridgway, who was sitting in a larger command plane, protested by radio: "There's nowhere to land."

"I've landed before," Lynch told Ridgway, "I can fly in, but it's a fucking mess."

"Fly in." Li Qiwei said.

Lynch landed safely.He handed Ridgway a carbine, and they walked across town, checking bridges for explosives and booby traps. "Then the vanguard of the 1st Cavalry Division, led by Charlie Doug (in the U.S. Army, if a person's initials are CD, is always given that nickname) Palmer, swarmed into town. So the first thing General Palmer sees is the 8th Army commander and a bunch of North Korean kids waving American flags."

Ridgway took great care to keep his criticisms of generals and soldiers a secret.At the press conference, he emphasized that he faced the task of rebuilding the 8th Army.Ridgway's personality and his frankness made him quite comfortable with the press.Journalists were a nuisance to Walker, who felt that the press did not give him enough credit—his defense of Pusan ​​was overshadowed by MacArthur's Incheon landings.When Walker wasn't throwing a fit at reporters, he ignored them.However, Li Qiwei realized that the image of war in the public must be shaped by the reports of war reporters, so he was very kind to the reporters.He also persuaded James Quark to return to his old job and actively manage his relations with the press.Quark had been one of General George S. Patton's public information officers and later became a director of the Philadelphia Inquirer.Quark knows how to provide small conveniences and services to help the press do its job well.He hung a large map in the journalist dormitory area of ​​​​the Eighth Army Headquarters, marked with constantly updated tactical markings.He also installed a telephone switchboard in the press area so that reporters could use the phone to solicit quick updates from the battlefield.He built a soundproof booth for radio announcers.Reports about Ridgway reflect the press's fondness for him.For the American public, Ridgway has become a "competent general" who bravely confronts the enemy, strictly manages the army, and knows people well.Some reporters snickered at the two grenades Ridgway hung from his field jacket, but Captain Mike Lynch thought the comments were unfair. "General Ridgway was constantly under fire. Several times we took off with mortar shells falling around us. We also took prisoners within a few yards of the plane after one advance by the 8th Regiment."

But Ridgway is also not shy about reporting that he considers to be inaccurate and unreliable. On Jan. 1, he refused to allow New York Herald Tribune reporter Margaret Higgins to send a message saying that "U.S. officials" and "senior military figures" believed the situation in North Korea was "absolutely inconceivable." hope".Ridgway explained in a note to MacArthur: "Since Miss Higgins has been here, she has never interviewed any of the Command's authorized spokespeople. It is not known which government officials she has spoken to." .” Her views “do not reflect those of the Command.”Ridgway reminded MacArthur's chief of staff, General Doyle Hickey, that Higgins was "rather outraged" and that her criticisms might be heard again.

Ridgway was respectful and cautious when dealing with MacArthur, although he was wary of the commander in his heart.In his daily telegrams to Tokyo, he often inserted a tribute to MacArthur, and took care to avoid any criticism that might reach the general.He never forgot MacArthur's famous ego, and knew the consequences of offending it. On February 2, Assistant Secretary of the Army Earl Johnson sent Ridgway an op-ed by Drew Pearson stating that "Ridgway profited enormously from MacArthur's mistakes as he turned North Korea's fiasco into victory." shallow".Johnson wrote: "Without commenting on the merits of this point of view, you recognize even more clearly than I do the need not to allow such arguments to cause adverse emotional reactions in General MacArthur. You may expect me to take the any possible action to counteract this unfortunate practice." Ridgway understood this, and he replied that the matter was "very delicate and I must proceed with care, because in spite of the innocence of my side . . . Reckless, completely innocent words and deeds may be misinterpreted ... it is also easy."

Ridgway's job was made easier by MacArthur's distance from North Korea during the first few weeks of the Eighth Army's command change.Li Qiwei followed the rules.He telegraphed to MacArthur almost daily, reporting on his work to restore Eighth Army to operational readiness and his intention to launch a limited counteroffensive when he thought the troops were ready.He and MacArthur lamented the ambiguous directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by which troops acted, but Ridgway took pains to explain to commanders why they couldn't get the aid they demanded and why they couldn't end the war. to China.He was blunt. "Our base of mobilization has been destroyed to support our troops in North Korea," he said. "Our logistical warehouses and shelves have been exhausted. The United States cannot afford to do anything significant anywhere else in the world except in North Korea." Try hard." But he still wanted to instill in his officers "the fullest confidence that we can stay indefinitely until the defense turns to the offensive."

One of the results of Ridgway's openness is that while people admit defeat is imminent, rumors of a full-scale retreat from North Korea have subsided.Ridgway knew that once his soldiers understood that they were here in Korea and that the troop transports were not coming to pick them up anytime soon, they would fight on.By the end of January, after a month of vigorous work and the removal of large numbers of useless officers, Ridgway looked forward to the offensive.

MacArthur's proposal was rejected
The achievement of General Ridgway in stopping the Chinese New Year Offensive only strengthened the resolve of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to veto MacArthur's December 1950 proposal of an alternative of either expanding the war or withdrawing from Korea.MacArthur's last batch of urgent messages in December had asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to "reconsider" the resolution they had vetoed against China, or they would have to pay the price of being forced to retreat.The Joint Chiefs of Staff were unmoved.After a polite two-week interval, the Joint Chiefs of Staff called MacArthur on January 12, 12, to say that his proposed retaliatory measures would be "seriously considered" and that he should accept certain conclusions."It is unlikely that a policy shift or other external contingency would justify intensifying our efforts in North Korea," they said. A blockade of China would also have to wait until the U.S. position in North Korea is stabilized or withdrawn.Even then, the blockade of China would have to be negotiated with the British, since "the extent of British trade with China via Hong Kong and the consent of the United Nations" would have to be considered.As for naval and air strikes against China, "I am afraid that it will only be authorized when the Chinese Communist Party attacks U.S. forces outside of North Korea."The Joint Chiefs of Staff (1951th) refused to use Chinese Nationalists in North Korea.Then they reiterated the order to MacArthur: "Under the primary consideration of the fundamental mission of ensuring the safety of your ministry and defending Japan", you must resist steadily and "kill and injure the enemy as much as possible." "If, according to your clear judgment, it is necessary to retreat in order to avoid serious loss of personnel and materials, you may withdraw from North Korea to Japan at that time."

MacArthur angrily answered the telegram.Adjutant Courtney Whitney said MacArthur viewed it as a "trap" that required conflicting choices: stay in North Korea if possible, or withdraw if not.His response was to demand "clarification" from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which implied that he intended to reopen the debate (a trick MacArthur had played in December).MacArthur telegraphed that it was "self-evident" that the United Nations forces were not strong enough to hold both Korea and Japan.The strategic deployment "must be based on the policy of determining the relevance of US interests to the Far East, which is an overriding policy".A beachhead can hold out for a while, but not without losses. "Whether such losses qualify as 'severe' . . . depends in part on what one means by that word." (The Joint Chiefs of Staff have yet to define "serious.")
The United Nations Army has completed its original mission of driving North Korean troops out of South Korea.The United Nations Army was never intended to be used to "engage Chinese forces".United Nations forces—

Exhausted by long and arduous campaigns, their courage and fighting qualities were unjustly blamed in misunderstood retreats, and they were distressed by the shameful propaganda.Their morale will be a serious threat to their combat effectiveness unless the political basis for demanding their lives for time is clearly described and fully understood, and it is so motivating that the perils of combat are embraced.

(End of this chapter)