The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 84
The general acknowledged that these courses of action had earlier been rejected because they would have sparked an all-out war.But now that China is fully involved, "nothing we do will make the situation worse" as far as the country is concerned.The Soviet response was "nothing more than a guess," and MacArthur acknowledged that the Soviets were increasingly concerned about Japan, so he hoped to add four more divisions there.

He then directly challenged the fundamentals of the Truman administration's foreign policy, repeating an argument he's been frustrated with in the past:
I fully understand Europe's need for security and am all for any possible action in this region, but not so much as to accept failure elsewhere.I am sure that accepting this situation will inevitably lead to future failure in Europe as well.However, according to the most optimistic estimates, European defense readiness aims to reach a state of readiness within the next two years.The application of troops to the present pressing military situation in the Far East does not in any sense compromise this basic idea.On the contrary, doing so will fully guarantee that tempered troops can be sent to Europe in parallel with the military power developed by Europe itself.

MacArthur concluded by agreeing that the Joint Chiefs of Staff's tactical assessment was correct given the continued restrictions on his movement.The evacuation operation could only be accomplished through "a successively contracted defensive line south to the Pusan ​​beachhead," without any "advance decisions" being made before reaching the "beach front."Asked what exactly he meant by the "beachhead," MacArthur retorted that unless there was "the possibility of some policy shift, or other external contingencies that would strengthen our efforts in North Korea," the evacuation "Anytime" can start.But "if there is a reasonable possibility of favorable developments" (meaning some kind of policy shift in Washington), he can delay the withdrawal until his troops are driven to the old areas along the Nakdong River north of Busan. front.

No matter how frequent the telegrams were between Washington and Tokyo, and regardless of whether MacArthur's request for more troops and power was successful or not, the survival of the United Nations became the primary responsibility of General Matthew Ridgway and the more than 10 American, South Korean and allied troops on the battlefield.If they could hold on to a front, stop the advance of the Chinese and injure them, the strategy of Truman, Acheson, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff might still be able to control the war.If not, the UN troops will be driven out of North Korea.So, in the last days of December, Ridgway began to perform his duties like a soldier, leaving behind the political-military dispute that broke out between MacArthur and his superiors 12 miles away.

Li Qiwei on the battlefield

A few hours after Ridgway arrived in North Korea, the Chinese launched an attack on the forward positions of the 8th Army on the morning of New Year's Eve. The harsh attack whistle and the explosion of mortar shells seemed to welcome the new leader field commander.They again concentrated their attacks on South Korean forces along the long front in western North Korea, crushing them in the first hours of fighting.

Li Qiwei quickly ordered: If you have to retreat, then retreat, but the Chinese must pay the price for every step forward.Before long he realized that the 8th Army could no longer hold out, and he ordered a retreat, even though retreat meant that Seoul would fall again.By January 1951, 1, the Eighth Army had been forced to retreat about 4 miles south to the Jinjiang line.At this time, the Chinese had run out of supplies, and their advance was temporarily stopped.

From a tactical point of view, Li Qiwei does not think that this retreat is a big defeat.One of the benefits it gained was that the Eighth Army now possessed a front that ran across the waist of the Korean Bee - from Pyeongtaek to the east, through Wonju to Samcheok on the east coast.The reorganized 8th Army is sending troops north from the Pusan ​​circular defense zone.Li Qiwei now has a front to stand on and fight on.Although no one realized it at the time, the retreat of the Eighth Army was the last retreat made by the entire army system.In the next few months, the melee state on the front line will be eliminated, and individual units will continue to make short retreats, but the 10th Army will never be forced to retreat again.

A few weeks ago, when Ridgway was still in Washington, the Joint Chiefs of Staff called the Jinjiang line "the last trench" and said that if the United Nations forces were forced to retreat so far south, then the issue of withdrawing from North Korea would have to be considered .However, Li Qiwei didn't think about retreating at all.He had informed Washington that he would need time to rebuild the Eighth Army.Now, his headquarters is stationed on a front line, from where he can act at random.

In the first few days on the front, he decided on his operational philosophy. Gaining or losing "territory" was irrelevant, and Ridgway was not pushing just to occupy a few square miles that the Chinese might retake a few days later.What he asked of the troops, in the most vivid form, was to kill the Chinese.

Within days of taking office, Ridgway realized how deeply wounded the Eighth Army had been, physically and psychologically, by the ordeal of the past few weeks.In a private letter to General Collins he said:
There is definitely an air of tension, of impending doom, of uncertainty, a state of mind of uncertainty... I know very well that our troops have lost heart.You can see this in their eyes and gait.It can be seen in the faces of their officers—from non-commissioned officers to senior officers.They were unresponsive and unwilling to talk, and I had to go to the bottom to learn something from them.They lacked all that readiness and aggressiveness to be found in the morale of troops.

In pure old Army fashion, Ridgway kicked people's ass to get his troops to change course.He himself stopped a retreating convoy of six Korean trucks, asked them where they were going, and ordered them back to the front, an order carried out at the carbine of a military policeman Ridgway brought to the scene .From December 6, 1950, he stayed on the battlefield for three days, talking with soldiers and generals.He called the troops together in groups of dozens and hundreds, and told them that there was nothing incurable in the Eighth Army.Later he said:
I told them their fathers would roll in their graves if they knew what I had heard about the bad conduct of some of their officers in battle. . . . In the hours of battle, I want division commanders to be with their vanguard battalions, and I want corps commanders to be with the regiments that are fighting the hardest.If they have paperwork they can do it at night.During the day, where the guns blared were where they should be.

He wanted the "severeest punishment and maximum retardation" of any advance by the Communist Party.In a briefing for officers of the 1st Marine Division, he asked their troops to "let the blood of Red China flow like a river."At a staff meeting on January 1951, 1, he issued a general order: "Seek every opportunity to severely punish the Chinese ... look for opportunities to ambush the Chinese, and place strong troops in ambush on the flanks to launch a sudden and violent attack Annihilate it." Ridgway issued a standing order to his commanders: "Create the spirit of attack in all troops." He ordered the officers of the staff to go to the field every few days, "no imagination can replace Field trips in the field".The mission of the troops is not to make sacrifices. “Let all troops know that we will not abandon them or leave them in a desperate situation,” he said. “We will fight for them unless it is clear that a rescue operation will result in losses equal to or greater than the number of troops.”

Revitalizing a decimated army is no easy task.Ridgway was a former airborne commander, and he was used to dealing with aggressive officers and soldiers.He vented much of his frustration in his letters to General Collins. On January 1, he complained that "certain corps and divisional commanders lack aggressiveness."On his first tour of the battlefield, he found that American troops had dug into fortifications when faced with the numerically superior Chinese.Ridgway described that American officers believed that "any major attack launched by our side will fail, and there may be heavy losses."Ridgway agreed, but ordered that American forces should attack by day, taking advantage of air superiority and "our enormous armor advantage."Ridgway continued in his letter to Collins:
During the first day after the enemy's attack, my instructions were not carried out.

I repeated the instructions myself that night.During the day the next day, at my insistence, the two armies made efforts.But in my opinion, this effort is still not enough.

I have repeatedly personally instructed the commanders of these two corps that, when directing the retreat, their main forces should be deployed to launch a vigorous counter-offensive with armor and infantry each day, and to withdraw these forces as necessary in the evening.

But these orders were also not implemented.

Li Qiwei didn't have time to run a training course for the officers.If officers failed to accomplish anything on the battlefield, he wanted them out of North Korea.He set up a screening committee to weed out the incompetent and the weak (he complained that not enough names went up for screening).He turned to his old Army network for some trusted friends who could be placed in command positions.For example, Colonel Dan Gilmer was teaching at the Army War College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and Ridgway asked him to lead a regiment. (The Joint Chiefs of Staff let Ridgway select officers through channels outside the Pentagon.) Ridgway warned Gilmer that North Korea would be a problem.He wrote: "I keep realizing that here the situation is very similar to that of a trainer in a cage surrounded by ligers. As long as every nerve of mind and body of the trainer is on alert, He has the advantage. But time is his relentless enemy. One major oversight, one small inadvertence, the slightest let down of his guard, and he could be in trouble." Gilmer came to North Korea.

Ridgway insisted that staff officers and commanders "get out, out of their bunkers, and inspect units in the field .He said:
I don't want any staff officer sitting there smoking a cigarette thinking and maybe taking a few steps after receiving a telegram requiring action.I want him to pick up the phone, or pick up his hat, and do what is asked of him.

Ridgway was also very dissatisfied with the field reports sent by the commanders, which "will give you ... the details of why a unit retreated. Well, you get the impression that they retreated under pressure, but That's not the case at all. They're changing battle lines, to take advantage of terrain, or something like that."He complained to Lieutenant General John Coulter, deputy commander of the Eighth Army:

We are a long way from making American forces physically and mentally resilient.As you will recall, in every battle of the Civil War, fewer American troops fought than we now have on the front lines, and lost twice as many in a few hours as our army currently does in six months The number of casualties in battle.

Ridgway told Collins that he was prepared to "treat our general officers without mercy if they were incompetent".Then, he quickly began to dismiss these generals, which is tantamount to a professional death sentence for professional soldiers.The officer class is a pyramidal system into which people join after graduating from West Point or an officer preparatory school, and achievement is measured by promotion. "Star" means that the military rank is the pinnacle.Now Li Qiwei had to do this unpleasant thing.Certain generals of the 8th and 10th armies performed poorly and had to be dismissed.

First and foremost was Major General Robert B. McClure, who had commanded the hapless 2nd Infantry Division for just over a month.McClure took command of the disjointed division shortly after the "first campaign" in China.During this campaign, from 1950 November to 11 December 27, the division suffered over 12 casualties, including most platoon, company and battalion commanders. On December 2, McClure took over the division and spent a month rebuilding it, which was still going on when the Chinese launched the New Year Offensive.

At that time, the 2nd Division was responsible for sticking to Wonju, an important town south of the Han River in central North Korea.During this battle, McClure caused Almond's serious displeasure.McClure became aware during the course of the battle that the Chinese were threatening his main supply line, which ran through a deep canyon to the south of Wonju.McClure did not want his men to be cut off and killed as they had been during the Chinese offensive, so he decided to retreat through the canyon and cover Wonju with artillery fire.But to retreat, he had to get the approval of his corps commander, General Almond.A regimental commander at the time, Colonel Paul Freeman (later a four-star general), recounted:
McClure could not find General Almond, and in the end he made his own decision.In the blinding blizzard we were ordered to retreat from Wonju...to a position about twelve miles north of the canyon and set up minefields, booby traps, etc.

That night, we received an order to reoccupy Wonju, and our retreat from Wonju was not approved by the army commander. ... At this time, the snow was very deep, and the landmines and booby traps we set up were all covered by snow and could not be eliminated.

A battalion was set out for this task, they rushed under heavy artillery fire, and withdrew with McClure's approval.Supporting artillery fire "was far behind the commander," Freeman said, and "we didn't get the coordination we were supposed to get."The next day, Freeman sent two of his battalions to retake Won State.During the battle, a blizzard raged, and an angry Almond rushed to the scene.In Freeman's milder expression: "There was some debate about whether his instructions and orders had been carried out." In addition, Almond found that a battalion commander had no There was no operational map or sketch of the location; no battalion staff was present at the forward command post; artillery fire "rarely" hit the target, and there was no coordination between the attacking infantry companies and artillery support.McClure's days as general of Eighth Army were numbered.

On Ridgway's instructions, Almond proceeded to file a formal case for McClure's dismissal. On January 1, a week after the defeat of the 9nd Army Division, Almond visited the division's defense area again. What he wanted was conclusive evidence about McClure's dereliction of duty.Almond did not bother to search, he found the artillery strewn all over the rear of the line, defenseless against infiltrators; the division's artillery officer was not at the front, and half of its 2 howitzers were unused. "While I was inspecting the starting point of the attack," Almond reported, "an artillery company fired two volleys and missed, but the shells fell into the center of the right-wing assault battalion. Nothing could be more frustrating." He wrote to Ridgway that these circumstances "not only illustrate why all efforts cannot be made to delay and destroy the enemy forces, but also illustrate the carelessness of the commander's operations at the division level".

(End of this chapter)