The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 83
On the evening of December 12, General Matthew Ridgway was having dinner with old Army friends at Fort Myer.In the middle of an after-dinner cocktail, a phone call from General Lawton Collins "made my evening go crazy."

Li Qiwei returned to the living room, and nodded to his wife after drinking the remaining wine in the glass.When the two left, Li Qiwei didn't say a word about the content of the phone call.Even when they got home, he remained silent. "She can sleep, but I can't." Over coffee the next morning, he broke the news: General Walton Walker had been killed in an accident, and Ridgway would "report without delay" to succeed him. position.Mrs. Ridgway was not surprised, "she accepted this fact like a brave and well-bred person, with the fortitude typical of a soldier's wife."

Unbeknownst to Ridgway, Collins and MacArthur had selected him as Walker's successor a few months earlier, when they decided that another general should be found to lead the U.S. military. (Collins said in his memoirs that Ridgway was chosen in advance because Walker always put danger at the front and might one day be killed in battle. Collins deftly avoided mentioning that he had suggested that Walker should be fired. .)
After a series of hurried briefings at the Pentagon, Ridgway learned that he was leaving for Asia that night.He had wanted to spend Christmas at home, but two days' delay would not do.He couldn't bear to tell his wife the news, so he asked Army Deputy Chief of Staff General Wade Hayslip to make a call for him.General Collins asked Ridgway if he would like a staff member to accompany him. "No," he answered, "I'm going alone this time. It's Christmas, and even a bachelor has his plans."

In December of this year, Matthew Ridgway was 12 years old.He was a handsome, austere and austere man who had spent nearly his entire life in the U.S. Army.He was born in Fort Monroe, Virginia, the son of an artillery colonel in the regular U.S. Army.In the West Point Class of 55, he captained the football team and played on the ice hockey team.The West Point yearbook commented: "There is no doubt that he is the number one busy man here." One of his classmates was General Lawton Collins who sent him to North Korea, and another classmate was General Mark Clark, who later succeeded His duties in North Korea.

Ridgway missed the opportunity to fight in World War I.In the years between the wars he had done the dull jobs of the peacetime army.He served in China, Nicaragua and the Philippines.In addition to honing his patience, he learned Spanish, which made him the most popular man in various Latin American embassies during his tenure in Washington. His selection in 1942 to command the 82nd Division came at a good time: The 82nd was one of two divisions that Pentagon strategists had decided to convert into airborne divisions.The Airborne Division will be the elite unit of the Army, and Ridgway has been with them since the beginning.He led the 82nd Division into the Battle of Normandy on D-Day, and then commanded a corps.Li Qiwei is not universally loved.He could award a division commander for his bravery, and then take him aside and reprimand him for not advancing fast enough. "An ass-kicking guy," one subordinate said of him, "you might save the whole damn division and be appreciated, but make sure you polish your brass buttons."

After the war, the Pentagon made Ridgway a military diplomat, first serving on the United Nations Military Advisory Board, then as chairman of the Inter-American Defense Council (the coordinating body for defense in the Western Hemisphere), and later as Commander in the Caribbean. In 1949, he was recalled to the Pentagon as Deputy Army Chief of Staff.Before long, Ridgway was recognized in the Army system as the future chief of staff.

In addition to his strong will and talent, what Li Qiwei brought to North Korea also has other special features. He had organized sports at West Point in the 20s, when MacArthur was the principal there, and Ridgway was able to show both respect and reservations for the general.He was well aware of MacArthur's weaknesses: "his habit of slightly exaggerating and boasting" and his habit of "attributing nothing to himself".Li Qiwei pointed out that MacArthur was so showy——

This constantly drove him to put on the airs of a real commander on the ground in public every time he had his ground forces involved in landing operations and launching major offensives.He deliberately cultivated aloofness, as if it were a characteristic of genius, until it became something out of place ... depriving him of the critical opinion and fair appraisal a commander needs from his subordinates.His headstrong personality...sometimes makes him insist on going his own way regardless of superficial logic.His confidence in his own judgment gave him an infallible hunch which eventually led him to disobedience.

When meeting in Tokyo on the evening of December 12, MacArthur pointed out that Ridgway would have more tactical initiative on the battlefield than General Walker.MacArthur's highest hope is "tactical success-strive to inflict heavy damage on the enemy and keep... South Korea as much as possible", and any military achievements "will enhance our diplomatic initiative."Finally MacArthur said simply: "Matt, the Eighth Army is yours."

Decided to stand firm in North Korea

Concurrent with the Eighth Army commander change, the long-running attempt by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department to coordinate military and political objectives came to an end.Dean Acheson is the clear winner.Throughout December, he was in the ironic position of trying to convince the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the military could hold out in North Korea while his diplomats would negotiate for peace. Dozens of Pentagon briefings in December made clear the military's view that the Korean War was, as General Bradley put it, "the wrong war, at the wrong time, in the wrong place."As with many compromises, the outcome satisfies no one in either Washington or Tokyo.

A series of meetings in December began to climax on the evening of December 12. Truman summoned Secretary of State Acheson, Secretary of Defense Marshall, and General Bradley to Blair Tower to discuss, in Truman's words, "Can we be there?" (North Korea) hold our ground; what should we do if we cannot hold it.”According to Acheson, there was apparently consensus on what he called the "big goal," which was to oppose aggression on the basis of collective security and to hold positions as best we could. "A setback does not justify a retreat. We are not absolutely outnumbered in North Korea...the CCP is also burdened with an attack....We should put the CCP to the test to see if they have the great power that people think they have..." Acheson added, however, that a final escape was necessary, "we never intended to keep a large force there," but that any withdrawal should be done without loss of troops, because "they represent our A large part of the strength."

Acheson asked Marshall about the orders that had been given to MacArthur. He "didn't understand" why MacArthur would transfer the 3rd Infantry Division out of Japan and back to Korea when Japan's defense had become a top priority.Marshall replied that, given the number of military orders that had been issued, he feared "a misinterpretation of them."He believes that these orders should be "reconsidered and rewritten as necessary".The consensus reached was: Since there is no spare power to defend Japan, MacArthur should not take the risk of destroying his troops.The generals agreed to rewrite the order issued to MacArthur.

The next morning, Acheson informed his subordinates of the meeting at Blair Building.The consensus was that the State Department should draw up something for the President to consider because (as Acheson put it) "we assume the Pentagon is doing these things."Rusk sees only three ways to end the fighting: (1) achieve military victory and stabilize the situation, which is "beyond our ability"; (2) "Voluntary defeat or withdrawal under pressure, and then continue our harassment tactics".Rusk favors the second option.

But will this bring in Russian air power?None of the State Department officials thought so.The opportune time for the air strike, when American troops were withdrawing from the north, had passed.If the Soviets wanted to fight an all-out war, they had the opportunity to fight it at that time, because destroying the US military would leave Japan without defense.

Rusk wanted the State Department to act quickly and make its own recommendations before the Pentagon or MacArthur got ahead.Ambassador Jessup said he "felt Marshall would rather make decisions here than have General MacArthur make them in the field."

But the military is not standing still. On December 12, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a memorandum to Marshall that reflected the tone of their December 26 meeting.Since the United States cannot reinforce MacArthur, and the Chinese are clearly strong enough to drive his army away, if the United Nations forces are to be driven out of Korea, the United States should choose the time and place of withdrawal and not "in an almost military rout" was thrown out.The Joint Chiefs of Staff memo dismissed the State Department's view that political considerations required an extended period of resistance.The chiefs of staff determined that "the decision to withdraw should not be based on politics; rather, it should be based on the best military judgment as to whether and for how long it is possible to retain combat forces in North Korea."They believed that the last time for an orderly withdrawal would be when the UN forces reached Jinjiang, north of Daejeon.If it is necessary to retreat to this line, and the Chinese begin to assemble a large army to launch a new offensive, then MacArthur should be ordered to start retreating to Japan.The Joint Chiefs of Staff presented a draft order to add to their recommendations.

At Marshall's insistence, he discussed the draft with Acheson and Rusk on December 12.Rusk asked for revisions to the draft, emphasizing that it is politically beneficial to the United States to resist as much as possible in North Korea and to cause the greatest loss to the Chinese.The final text approved by President Truman contained many ambiguities (ambiguities that had undermined previous orders to MacArthur), but the authorization to withdraw troops was so specific that Undersecretary of Defense Robert Lovett called it the It is a "clearly revealed" message. On December 28, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued an order to MacArthur:
By all conceivable calculations, China clearly has the capability to force UN troops out of North Korea, if they choose to use that capability.the implementation of such a capability could be prevented by making their efforts so costly that they would be abandoned...or by committing significant US reinforcements...but doing so would seriously jeopardize other commitments, including Japan's Safety.It is unrealistic to get a large troop surge against North Korea from other UN member states.We believe that North Korea is not the place to wage a large-scale war.We are convinced that the growing threat of all-out war should not be risked by engaging our available ground forces in North Korea against Chinese forces.However, successful resistance to Chinese-North Korean aggression in certain positions in North Korea, as well as the destruction of CCP's military and political prestige, is of paramount importance to our national interest if this is achieved without incurring serious losses if.

Your basic order to provide assistance to the Republic of Korea such as repelling an armed attack if necessary and re-establishing international peace and security in the region now has to be modified in light of the current situation.

As you have outlined (wired December 12th), you are being ordered to defend your positions and inflict as much damage as possible on the hostile forces in Korea, with the primary consideration of ensuring the safety of your troops .Efforts, both conventional and unconventional, should continue to mobilize South Korea to maximize its contribution to sustained resistance.

Given the potential for developments to force our withdrawal from North Korea, it is important to determine in advance the last reasonable time for our orderly withdrawal, all the more so given the continued threat to Japan.In our opinion, if you are to be forced to retreat to your positions near Jinjiang and the line east of it, and if thereafter large Chinese Communist forces gather in front of your positions and are clearly capable of forcing you to withdraw from North Korea, it is necessary under these conditions to order You started withdrawing to Japan.

Your opinion on the above conditions is requested in order to make a decision to begin the retreat, especially in view of your continued primary mission of defense of Japan, which rests solely with Eighth Army units.

Courtney Whitney, an adjutant who had followed MacArthur for many years, later said that when MacArthur read the telegram, "I can't remember when I have seen such vivid and unforgettable pain in his facial expressions."For MacArthur, the telegram signaled that "the 'will to win' has come to naught in Korea" and that Truman's determination to liberate and unify the land "has now almost degenerated into defeatism. Washington's plans were not The best route to the counter-offensive, but the best route to rout. No solution to the problem is proposed, even if the use of the Chinese Nationalists is of no avail. This is unrealistically expecting those who have already fought a war and won People who fought that war, and are now preparing to fight a bigger war, did the impossible."MacArthur declared: "The idea of ​​defeat in Korea was never on my mind." (In sharp contrast to this, he had called Washington several times in the preceding weeks to say that he had actually been defeated, and that nothing but retreating There is no other way.) MacArthur declared that, had it not been for the "artificial restrictions" imposed by diplomats, he could not only have saved North Korea, "but would have dealt a devastating blow to Red China's ability to wage a war of aggression so that for generations to come to remove this further threat to peace in Asia".

MacArthur then rebutted what Whitney called "the most important personal commentary he ever made on the Korean War."He began with the illusion that since the telegram was so contrary to his own ideas, it was unlikely to be the final decision Washington had made. "A comprehensive assessment of the capabilities of the various aspects of the Korean War," he said in his telegram, "will obviously depend on the military-political strategy yet to be worked out." With troops massed in Korea and "Manchuria," the rest of the country is vulnerable.MacArthur urged the implementation of the four options of action proposed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which had been previously rejected, but which he said should be implemented if the administration was willing to "recognize the state of war imposed on us by the Chinese authorities: (1) Blockade China's coast; (2) Destroy China's industrial capacity to wage war by sea and air bombing; (3) Reinforce the United Nations Army with Chinese Nationalists; (4) Allow Nationalists to conduct diversionary actions against the mainland".

MacArthur believes that these actions "can seriously weaken and greatly neutralize China's ability to wage aggressive wars, so as to save Asia from being engulfed, or it will face this crisis."The pressure on the United Nations forces in North Korea will be relieved, and it will then be possible to decide whether to continue fighting there, deploy troops on coastal islands, and continue naval and air operations against China.

(End of this chapter)