The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 88
That spring, those around MacArthur saw that the general was exhausted and had lost the luster of his charisma and power.William Siebold, a political consultant in Tokyo, worked alongside MacArthur for many years and found MacArthur "tired and depressed."Lieutenant Colonel Adam Comosa, an advisor to the South Korean 9th Division, recalled when MacArthur visited his unit, which was north of the [-]th parallel, the northernmost position on the United Nations front. "MacArthur slumped in the front seat of the jeep as if completely exhausted," Comosa said. Doesn't look very energetic either. He's a lost man."

But MacArthur's public statements continued to flow.As the spring wore on and Ridgway made his mark, these statements from MacArthur were both defensible and competitive.For example, he decided to justify his disastrous "come home for Christmas" campaign again.

The November 1950 offensive was no longer the so-called reconnaissance operation that MacArthur had claimed after the failed offensive. He now described it as a clever strategic movement. "Our actual combat strategy for China's entry into the war includes a rapid retreat to lengthen the enemy's supply lines, the inevitable consequence of which is to increase the enemy's logistical difficulties and greatly enhance our air destruction capabilities. A strategy is effective." This sentence is very complicated, and it is worth pondering over and over again.Washington couldn't believe it when he heard this stark claim.Herbert Firth of the State Department said that if it was MacArthur's goal to lengthen the supply lines for the Chinese, "then it would be better for us to travel thousands of miles to the Philippines."Dean Acheson was taken aback by MacArthur's overturning of the old case: "It is difficult to conceive of anyone making a more heinous and stupid statement. . . . " He called this statement "the most obvious and foolish Attempts to assert that we have really deceived the Chinese by retreating all the way south on the Korean peninsula... is really ridiculous!"

Another sentence in MacArthur's statement is incompatible with the policies formulated by Acheson and Marshall in Washington, and is also incompatible with Ridgway's strategy and tactics on the battlefield. "Some people (emphasis added, MacArthur's criticisms are often not named) put forward the idea that we should establish a front across North Korea for positional warfare. This is unrealistic and fanciful." Acheson commented: "This is exactly the attitude of all our allies, and it was also the policy discussed by the government at that time, and it was also the policy finally adopted by the US government."

MacArthur Manufacturing Records

What the Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted, and what the State Department and other branches of government accepted, was a cease-fire and a return to pre-war status.That is to say, divide North Korea into two near the 2th parallel.This decision was made on February 6, and the chiefs of staff also rejected four other options proposed: reinforcement of United Nations forces to unify North Korea by force; consideration of troop withdrawal; military stalemate without any agreement; attempt to "Solve the North Korean problem" by defeating the Beijing regime. "Congress wants us out of North Korea," General Collins said. "If we're going to stay any longer, we have to make a case for our stay and make that clear to the people."

The Jan. 1 list was discussed again by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who simply decided to keep those options open for consideration and took no action.Although Ridgway had been authorized to cross the 12th parallel to capture certain tactical targets to defend his lines, no one was advocating that the war be returned to North Korea.

These decisions, made in late January and early February, showed a clear convergence of views between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department, both wanting to end the war through diplomacy rather than by expanding it.The critical situation in December last year and early January of this year has disappeared due to the continuous advancement of the Eighth Army on the battlefield.

However, MacArthur had other plans.In a series of telegrams in February, he again asked permission to bomb "Manchuria."He wrote: "It is an accepted basic fact that our ground forces in their present form cannot safely attempt a major operation in North Korea without authorizing an attack on enemy bases in 'Manchuria' (emphasis added Added).” MacArthur should know that the most important thing the Joint Chiefs of Staff should avoid at this moment is to take large-scale ground operations in North Korea.

MacArthur was now working on a long-term plan to destroy Chinese forces in North Korea, which he had only partially disclosed to Washington.His target will be Chinese supply lines.First of all, he wants to recapture the front line of Seoul as a base for future operations. "Then, I will use a large-scale air strike to sweep the enemy's rear across North Korea."

MacArthur was even more cunning if the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not approve his bombing plan, but he did not discuss the international (and domestic) reaction to the idea. "If I am still not permitted to attack enemy reinforcements massed on the other side of the Yalu River, or to destroy its bridges, I will set up a radioactive waste field with by-products of the atomic industry on all the enemy's major supply lines, and put the North Korea was separated from 'Manchuria'." The devastation suffered by North Korea had left it so impoverished that the food and arms needed by the Chinese had to be brought across the Yalu River, and the Chinese troops had only about 10 days' worth of food and Arms supply.Once these supplies were depleted, MacArthur could tighten this huge pocket by using American reinforcements and the Chinese Nationalist "simultaneous amphibious or airborne operations on both ends of North Korea's east and west coasts. The Chinese would soon starve , or surrender. Without food and ammunition, they will be helpless. There will be a situation similar to Incheon here, but on a much larger scale."

MacArthur's strategy ignored several relevant facts.The Joint Chiefs of Staff had repeatedly told him that he would not be able to get reinforcements or use the Nationalists; and that American policy did not allow another war to be fought in the North.Nuclear experts consulted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff say the "nuclear waste zone" will contaminate groundwater and rivers for decades.The Joint Chiefs of Staff ignored MacArthur. They didn't want any "Super Incheon" or "Radiation Zone".

Even when Ridgway was fighting for every inch of blood-stained ground with Chinese troops, killing thousands of Chinese every week, MacArthur complained that he needed more freedom of movement.He said in late February: "Our operational policy is mobile warfare, the goal of which is to punish the enemy as severely as possible... This policy has worked. But we must not mistakenly think that this achievement ... will inevitably lead to the enemy's defeat."

MacArthur was full of energy. On February 2, he again asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to authorize the bombing of the North Korean port of Rajin, which had been banned from attack since last September.Unidentifiable supplies passed through the port and its railway marshalling yards, and reconnaissance planes found 15 train wagons in one day.MacArthur called Razin "North Korea's last important, useful strategic target" and that destroying it by direct bombing "would inflict heavy losses on the enemy...Conversely, if it escaped attack, it would still be our military's a major threat."While some of his staff favored the bombing, Marshall and his deputy, Robert Lovett, opposed it.In addition to provoking retaliation by the Soviets, such an attack would be militarily difficult because the rail lines no longer lead to the south, and the North Koreans would simply move their supply operations across the border to Vladimir Vostok (Vladivostok).The Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore did not mention the matter in the presence of the President at all, although they also informed MacArthur that the decision to deny the bombing was based on political rather than military considerations: "It has been decided at the highest level of government that the Rajin The ban remains in effect for now."

A few days later, MacArthur again raised another topic that had been denied all along: bombing the various hydropower stations on the Yalu River.The Joint Chiefs of Staff initially raised the possibility in December, when MacArthur reported after reconnaissance that the facilities were "mainly idle" and that bombing the power stations would serve no military purpose.But on February 12, he made an "urgent" request for permission to bomb the dams.The Joint Chiefs of Staff recalled what MacArthur had said in December about the plants being idled, and replied, "No."

Why did MacArthur always make requests that would almost certainly be rejected by the Joint Chiefs of Staff?Even for his close friends, exploring MacArthur's intricate motives was a great mystery.In Washington, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other officials are left to guesswork.A State Department official thought he knew the answer: MacArthur was methodically producing a record that he could use to defend himself should the war suddenly turn bad again.He kept a record of his series of proposals and their repeated objections, and thus put himself in a position to blame "Washington" for future defeats on the battlefield.

Li Qiwei determined the battle line

By the end of February, General Ridgway's new offensive had straightened the U.N. front in the Korean bee waist.For the first time since the Chinese entered the war, the United Nations occupied a relatively stable front, and in the words of military historian James Schnabel: "There were no gaps, no weak points, no enemy salient threatening to tear the line apart. Two halves." In the east, South Korean forces had crossed the 2th parallel for several miles, digging deep into defenses and under cover from naval gunfire and carrier-based aircraft.For the third time, U.S. and South Korean forces recaptured Seoul from the Chinese (the capital of South Korea is in ruins and deserted, and the recapture of the city is only symbolic).Despite his occasional nitpicking, MacArthur gleefully called Washington on March 3 to say that he was "entirely satisfied with the situation on the front. One of the worst in modern warfare."MacArthur, elated by the success of his forces' northward advance, said: "The enemy now knows, is operating 1 miles from their bases, with 'sanctuary' behind them, and our air and navy are practically out of reach Combat is a completely different matter."

This telegram was MacArthur's last optimistic report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.In fact, the telegram was so optimistic and contrary to the norm of MacArthur's vicious words that Chief of the Naval Staff Sherman suspected that MacArthur was somehow up to something.

new diplomatic initiative
Just as Matthew Ridgway rebuilt the Eighth Army, so Dean Acheson rebuilt America's diplomatic initiative in the war.Acheson failed to initiate negotiations, but he did manage to isolate the Chinese with no one in the United Nations to support them except the well-known Soviet bloc countries.

To Acheson's tactical delight, the Chinese launched their New Year's Eve offensive, at a time when, in late December 1950, the UN was still trying to fathom why the Chinese had rejected the UN's cease-fire commission initiative.In Acheson's view, the Chinese refusal and their new offensive proved that the Chinese intended to carry out their "repeated threat" to drive the United Nations forces out of Korea, and it would be "impossible for the United Nations to ignore this attempt." understandable", suggesting that "acts of aggression 'on such a scale' can be carried out with impunity".The Truman administration began work on drafting a resolution condemning Chinese aggression and seeking support from other countries.

Much to Acheson's chagrin, the Ceasefire Committee did not accept the Chinese rejection of the ceasefire as a final statement, and proposed a new proposal on January 1951, 1, with only a few hours' advance notice to the United States.The package, designed to meet some of Beijing's demands, consists of five parts: (11) an immediate ceasefire; (1) a political conference to restore peace; (2) a phased withdrawal of foreign troops and discussions on government issues , "to make appropriate arrangements" for the Korean people; (3) to make arrangements for the unification and governance of Korea; and (4) to convene a conference after the cease-fire with the participation of Great Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, and China "to resolve the problems in the Far East" , including the status of Taiwan and Beijing's representation at the United Nations.

The first four of these measures are harmless, but the fifth, which states that the United States is willing to hand over Taiwan and accept Beijing into the United Nations, gives the US government what Acheson called "a choice with hidden murderous intentions." .Supporting the plan would mean "causing an uproar in Congress and the press"; opposing it would cost the United States its majority at the United Nations.However, in Acheson's view, on the issue of North Korea's aggression, any concession plan to the Chinese is a violation of basic justice and legal principles.Yet, as the foreign policy historian Richard Stebbins writes, the proposal "still has considerable appeal to those who feel that Beijing has been wronged in the past and must be appeased, and thus almost Do whatever it takes to avoid a possible all-out war."British Prime Minister Clement Attlee endorsed the proposal of the Ceasefire Commission, and he declared arrogantly: "In the name of common humanity, we should make great efforts to make us open up to each other and treat each other with sincerity." .”

Now that Attlee has announced first that he will favor Beijing's seat in the United Nations, the United States will be overwhelmed by a 3:1 advantage in the meeting after the armistice.So Acheson pondered the problem with his lawyer's head, gauging what the Chinese and the Soviets might do.He concluded that the Chinese wanted more from a UN solution and would reject the offer.He negotiated with Truman, who agreed that the United States would accept the plan and bide its time.That way, when the plan is formally proposed, Ambassador Warren Austin said, the United States will vote for it.

"Amazing appeasement!" cried Senator Robert Taft, and even Tom Connally, the staunch Democrat chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, railed against the State Department. "Wait!" advised Acheson (although he was a little worried when "the world was turned upside down" in Congress).The United Nations overwhelmingly approved the plan and communicated the matter to Beijing.

As Acheson expected, Beijing's reply confirmed the correctness of his strategy.A ceasefire proposal that does not include political negotiations is simply unacceptable.The Chinese have reiterated their earlier demands that China be given priority for admission to the United Nations and that the United States withdraw its troops from Taiwan as a condition for any negotiations.

(End of this chapter)