The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 89
Acheson's ruse was a success, and he called the Chinese response yet more evidence of "contempt for the world's demands for peace."The United Nations has done everything in its power to find a peaceful solution to the North Korean issue, he said: "We must now soberly face up to the fact that China has no intention of stopping their defiance of the United Nations."

On February 2, despite the objections of the United Kingdom and India, the United Nations General Assembly voted 1 in favor to 44 against, with 7 abstentions (9 countries from Burma, India and the Soviet bloc opposed the resolution, Sweden, Yugoslavia and 5 Asian and Arab countries abstained), declared China an aggressor.The resolution calls on Beijing to "make its troops and people ... cease hostilities ... and withdraw from North Korea".The resolution reaffirmed the UN's determination to "continue its operations in North Korea to counter aggression" and called on member states to "continue to provide all assistance" for operations in North Korea.The resolution also concluded with the creation of two special bodies: a committee to consider "further measures to counter this aggression" in emergency situations; and a three-member panel "to bring about a cessation of hostilities," effectively a ceasefire committee.

Acheson's ingenious manipulation of the United Nations worked wonders diplomatically.A peace plan proposed by some neutral countries was opposed by the Chinese, not the Americans, and now it is the Chinese who fly the flag of lawlessness.It is Beijing, not Washington, that is against peace.

For the Chinese, opposition to the ceasefire has resulted in a horrific human disaster.Because they thought too highly of themselves and apparently believed that the majority of the United Nations would support their demands, the Chinese rejected an opportunity to end the war on far more favorable terms than they had accepted two and a half years later.

The [-]th line becomes a problem again

Ridgway's offensive raised a question that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department had been battling since December 1950: Should the United Nations advance to the 12th parallel again?How should they act?Technically speaking, MacArthur was still acting on the orders given by the United Nations when it entered the war, namely to repel the aggressors and restore peace and security in the region.As mentioned earlier, the UN order also includes the long-term goal of "establishing a unified, independent and democratic North Korea".After the "second campaign" in China, MacArthur accepted new tactical tasks, but these orders from the United Nations were still in force.MacArthur's tactical mission was to keep troops in Korea for as long as possible without endangering his troops and Japan's defense.

For the same reason, MacArthur still had the authority to cross the 1950th Parallel, according to an order given to him by Washington on September 9, 27, and confirmed by the General Assembly on October 10.However, due to changes in the political situation, Acheson believed that any decision to move north of the 7th Parallel must be discussed with the Allied governments.

Thus began a rather peculiar minuet in which neither the State Department nor the Joint Chiefs of Staff were willing to come up with clear steps."Indeed, both sides are so insisting on letting the other make up their minds that it has led to some biting rhetoric that both are shirking responsibility," said Acheson. In Acheson's view, re-entering North Korea would "Created a serious crisis in the free world and caused certain allies (notably the British) to withdraw from the war".Acheson admitted that all of South Korea must be recaptured so that the enemy cannot achieve its main objective.Acheson also did not prohibit small-scale ground operations across the [-]th parallel in order to interfere with the opponent's offensive preparations.Stopping the fighting on the border would make negotiations easier, and Acheson didn't think the North Koreans would favor a truce, which would give UN forces (and South Korean forces) a small foothold on their soil.If the goal is to "punish the enemy as severely as possible," then the best way to achieve this goal is to stabilize a front on the [-]th Parallel, instead of going north to extend the supply line. Naval and air force operations in the north will continue.The State Department's Dean Rusk told the Joint Chiefs of Staff (with confidence) that the main reason for making a policy statement, in any case, was the need, as Averell Harriman argued, "to stabilize the "Truman's views on the [-]th Parallel issue.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff objected.As long as the UN's political goals remain unchanged, its military forces should not be prohibited from crossing the [-]th parallel for political reasons.This ban would allow the Chinese to muster large numbers of troops and prepare for battle with impunity.The rule of no crossing the border is only one-way, and the Chinese can still do whatever they want.Without freedom of movement, it was difficult for MacArthur to maintain an offensive, or even a strong defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff said.

But the chiefs of staff believed that it was too early to suggest how MacArthur should behave after arriving at the [-]th parallel.The Joint Chiefs of Staff considered any decision before then "military premature."The Joint Chiefs of Staff feared that the Allied discussions would leak to the enemy (with good reason. Apart from the Soviet spies Philby, Burgess and McClean, there were plenty of people in the British Labor government who were hostile to the UN cause ).What the Joint Chiefs of Staff want is for the State Department to specify the approach to achieving America's political goals.

The strength of the opposition from the Joint Chiefs of Staff made Acheson realize that the State Department's proposal against crossing the [-]th Parallel should not be sent to Truman.Marshall agreed, wishing to minimize discussions with other governments.

MacArthur, with only indirect knowledge of the intense debates among the various branches of the government, tried to force a decision by circuitous means. On March 1951, 3, he sent the Joint Chiefs of Staff a semimonthly report to the United Nations on his operations for the last two weeks of February.This is a routine document that usually talks about the military situation.One of MacArthur's words was considered a political bomb by the State Department:
Now that President Truman has stated that the crossing of the [-]th parallel is a military matter and should be resolved in accordance with my best judgment as a theater commander, however, I would like to make one point clear: When this issue does arise, it is persuasive I will not exercise this authority arbitrarily if the political reasons against the transgression have been raised at the time and there may be a reasonable need to limit the transgression.

At first glance, this remark seemed to give up any intention of crossing the [-]th parallel, but State Department officials immediately saw the foreshadowing.They saw no benefit in emphasizing the issue with UN allies, and they asked MacArthur to delete the sentence.He deleted it.

However, the situation on the battlefield within a few days brought the issue of the 3th parallel to the public's attention. On March 7, General Ridgway launched the "Operation Ripper" campaign, designed to drive a wide wedge into the middle of the Communist front and separate the Chinese in the west from the North Koreans in the east.Chuncheon, the main target of the campaign, was less than 10 miles away in a straight line from the 8th parallel.After occupying Chuncheon, the Eighth Army was only two days away from the [-]th Parallel.

On March 3, a reporter asked Truman whether the United Nations was planning to cross the 15th parallel. "It's a tactical question for the commander in the field," he replied. "The commander-in-chief seven thousand miles away won't intervene in field operations. We're working to liberate the Republic of Korea. . . The line has nothing to do with it."

Although Truman was ambiguous, his statement touched on issues that MacArthur had not been allowed to comment on until a few days ago.This, the general complained to his confidantes in Tokyo, was "only state officials are allowed to set fires, not civilians to light lamps. They can talk nonsense in Washington, but we veterans are not allowed to publish anything more than an 'early roll call report' (even one level reports, reporting how many soldiers were on duty on a given day) more meaningful speech".

As it happened, the State Department finally approved a draft statement on the purpose of fighting in Korea on the same day that Truman made his statement to reporters.While two months of discussions and several minor revisions are still required before final approval, the State Department document represents what Acheson called "relatively simple and sensitive conclusions" reached by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department. reached a consensus.

The document effectively abandoned the idea of ​​unifying North Korea by force.United Nations forces should continue to inflict as much enemy damage as possible and regain control of territory south of the 10th parallel.UN ground forces should be allowed to conduct "offensive defensive operations" within a range of approximately 20 to 1950 miles north of the 12th parallel "as may be required by the tactical situation."When the [-]th Parallel is actually reached, the United States should seek a ceasefire along a front that it had made clear to the UN Armistice Commission in December [-].If the enemy rejects these conditions, the UN forces—

Should continue to consume enemies as much as possible.They can attack north of the border to destabilize the enemy and interfere with their preparations for attack.However, there should be no full push, nor an attempt to occupy North Korean territory.The United States should continue to inflict heavy losses on Chinese forces in North Korea to overwhelm its prestige, and should continue to take economic and diplomatic action against its government.Military action directly against mainland China is not considered.

The draft replaces a list of options drafted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Jan. 1.This document was crucial to MacArthur for two reasons: it defined the range of operations he could take north of the 12th parallel; and second, it negated his anticipated actions against mainland China.True, the draft does not represent the final decision of the NSC or the President, but it does inform MacArthur in unmistakable terms that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department agree on how the war should be fought, and that the Chief of Staff The joint meeting was MacArthur's boss.

However, MacArthur would not be discouraged from expressing his feelings.A Dec. 12 presidential order ordering administration and other officials not to speak without Washington's approval had chilled the general for months. [An administration official argued that Truman's order had little to do with MacArthur's extraordinary silence, "in fact, (MacArthur) had just learned his lesson and really had nothing to say, even on his own behalf." ] Now, MacArthur was preparing to launch another propaganda war against his administration in such an outlandish way that for weeks the Pentagon and the White House debated: Is America's supreme commander in the Far East sane?

The CIA's fledgling
At the beginning of 1951, a CCP inspector reported to Beijing that the Chinese troops going to North Korea were suffering from hunger, cold and sickness, struggling to survive in the severe cold of tens of degrees below zero, and only survived on a few frozen potatoes every day. "When soldiers camped in the snow, their hands, feet and socks were frozen into lumps of ice, they couldn't unscrew grenade covers, they couldn't pull fuses...the skin on their hands was stuck to mortar shells and cannonballs. ..." With no shelter from the cold, the Chinese were plagued by disease and misery, with pneumonia and medical illnesses crippling thousands.

Although the Chinese had slowed down their fighting tempo after their victory in December 1950, General Matthew Ridgway knew that the lull would be short-lived.After their first two offensives, the Chinese were forced to pause for several weeks to redeploy and resupply supplies, which had been carried by manpower across the snow-covered and ice-covered peaks of North Korea.All Ridgway could do was try to rehabilitate his men (two Army divisions had been nearly wiped out in December) and hope to repel an enemy four or five times his strength.

Little did Ridgway know, his troops were about to receive vital help from some incredible source.They were: an American-Danish spy king, a Chinese Nationalist Coast Guard, and an anonymous American spy in the Indian government.

In mid-January 1951, the station chiefs of the CIA stations in the East received an urgent telegram from the Washington headquarters.The cable conveyed "hard" intelligence received from a secret service hidden in Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's Indian government.Although the Indian government publicly claimed to maintain a neutral attitude towards the Korean War, it gave China propaganda and diplomatic support from time to time.Now, Nehru's support is about to turn into material support again.According to the agent's report, the Chinese had chartered a Norwegian cargo ship and sent it to Mumbai, India, to load medical supplies provided by the Indian government.The shipping list was impressive, including three complete sets of field hospital equipment, plus various drugs (according to one American intelligence officer, "enough to give at least three injections of penicillin to every enemy soldier north of the 1th parallel") , surgeons, physicians, nurses and other medical personnel and appliances.

Washington's telegram to secret agencies everywhere was straightforward: "at any cost" the ship and its cargo must not reach the enemy.The Telegram did not dwell on the humanitarian aspects of the shipment.Once this medical supply reaches the Chinese troops in the field, it will enable them to launch a new offensive that will cost thousands of lives in the United States and South Korea.

But intercepting the ship is a rather sensitive diplomatic issue.Despite being a member of the United Nations, Norway has allowed its vast shipping community to continue to trade with the enemy despite diplomatic protests from the United States and other members of the United Nations that have troops at war.The United States avoided declaring a blockade of China for fear of offending the British, who also continued to trade with China in order to protect its direct colony of Hong Kong.

Thus, a conundrum arises: How can the United States stop the shipment without setting off a diplomatic uproar that unravels an already fragile diplomatic alliance?The call from CIA headquarters did not address the issue, it simply instructed agents everywhere to carry out their mission, and to do it quietly, at any cost.But the telegram did contain an unmistakable but unspoken warning: Do not embarrass the US government.

Thus began Operation TP-Shawl, an unabashed (successful) act of piracy attacking foreign ships on the high seas in disregard of international law.The CIA had already participated in the Korean War, and it fought and fought.

The order finally came to Atsugi, Japan, and to Hans Toft's office.The Dane-American is imposing, with thinning blond hair and a slightly Scandinavian accent.He was virtually unknown outside the self-contained intelligence community, yet Tofte enjoyed a reputation among his peers as one of the most outstanding agents of the 20th century.And what he did before he saw the telegram about the Norwegian ship was a good indication why he was a perfect fit for the mission.

(End of this chapter)