The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 93 Mai Shuai dismissed (1)
In the accepted chronicle of Truman's biography (this one the president himself brokered), Douglas MacArthur is described as a defiant general whose public statements in March and April 1951 exceeded the Tolerable limits are challenging the policies of the government authorities.But General Charles Willoughby, MacArthur's head of intelligence, could not accept this argument.In his rather scathing memoirs, Willoughby charged: "It seems that all the so-called 'reasons' of the government must be covering up something deeper."

What Willoughby is alluding to is that MacArthur fell victim to the evil forces in the State Department and the British Foreign Office, and even the covert Communist spies who influenced Truman and American policy.However, he inadvertently touched a deeply hidden secret of the Truman administration: Douglas MacArthur was dismissed not because of his public remarks, but because of some foreign conspiracies that President Truman could not tolerate.

The truth about MacArthur's loss of office is little known in Washington.Truman reckoned that the "public" story was enough to justify MacArthur's dismissal anyway.And more than 30 years later, it is impossible to figure out who in the government knows why Harry Truman dismissed MacArthur, and who only knows the public reason.

The factors that led to MacArthur's subsequent downfall lay buried in 1947, when the NSA was created.During the Korean War, there was little public mention of the existence of this extremely secret service.The NSA protects U.S. government communications from intrusion using elaborate encryption machines and other equipment, and monitors the communications of other countries, both friendly and enemy. (The NSA has other covert missions. For example, interrogating high-ranking defectors from the Soviet bloc in its heavily guarded buildings.)
But no matter how grand the reasons for national security, wiretapping a friendly country is always a disgraceful thing to do.Until the 20s, Secretary of State Henry Stimson was still furious: "A gentleman does not peek at the other party's letters." This creed has long been outdated in the foreign ministries and intelligence agencies of the world. Mutual embarrassment was avoided.

In the spring of 1951, the NSA's main listening post in Japan was at Atsugi Air Base outside Tokyo, and its main mission was to monitor Chinese communications.But NSA technicians also regularly listen in on messages sent back to their capitals by diplomats stationed in various countries.Much of this wiretapping is fueled by bureaucratic curiosity: Do the diplomats say the same thing to their Foreign Office as they do to U.S. officials in Tokyo?

Technicians do the actual interception and deciphering of the messages, but they don't analyze what they "hear".Copies of the cables cascaded up the bureaucracy, first to the NSA headquarters in Washington.During the Korean War, the bureau occupied the ramshackle buildings of Arlington Hall, an Army encampment near Washington's Virginia suburbs.The cables were then sent to designated officials in the intelligence community, the State Department and the Pentagon.The intercept itself is strictly classified, even by those units that use it.Sometimes these intercepts are disguised as coming from other sources.

In 1951, two countries were among the foreign embassies monitored in Tokyo, Spain and Portugal.Both countries were run by right-wing dictators, which endowed Douglas MacArthur with a fondness for both countries. In mid-March 1951, President Truman received an intercepted telegram from Spanish and Portuguese diplomats stationed in Tokyo in which they reported to their superiors their conversation with General MacArthur.The gist of the conversation: This general is confident that he can turn the Korean War into a major conflict and get rid of the "China problem" once and for all.MacArthur hoped that if this happened, Portugal or Spain would not panic; the Soviet Union would either stay out of it or face disaster.

Truman and three or four of his closest advisers saw the intercepted messages.The gist, if not the full text, of the cable was passed on to the State Department's policy planning team, whose director, Paul Nietzsche, and his deputy, Charles Burton Marshall, were working on a policy to end the war.

As Truman read the cables, his jaw clenched and he burst into tears.He said it was an outright betrayal.His tone is flat, indicating that he is trying to control his anger.Truman had no other choice, and MacArthur had to be fired.Although he assured Washington that he would obey, he told foreign governments that he did not intend to do so at all, but that he would continue to gradually break through "political constraints" until he forced the United States into a larger war that he believed was necessary. war.

Neither Truman nor anyone else could use it publicly, since the sources were not made public.The United States in 1951 was not about to admit that it had wiretapped friendly countries.Therefore, the issue of MacArthur's dismissal has to rely on other channels, relying on his public remarks, and there are many of them.

Truman's actions were greatly restricted.If he could disclose MacArthur's conversations with the Portuguese and the Spaniards, MacArthur would be completely finished immediately.Americans may be able to accept MacArthur's criticism of U.S. policy as an expression of freedom of speech, but secretly plotting to overturn policy is another matter entirely.

Thus, Truman found himself in an ironic situation.Even when MacArthur complained that Washington was forcing him to fight a "limited war" in North Korea, he also benefited from the situation: Truman decided to act, but the White House had no choice but to fight a "limited war" against MacArthur as well. no choice.

MacArthur speaks boldly
MacArthur's misfortune is that his public remarks provided sufficient grounds for Truman to dismiss him, even without the need to use intercepted communications.Had MacArthur been aware that Washington was sensitive to his criticism (and he should be, especially after Truman gagged him on December 1950, 12), his public statements beginning in early March 6 were entirely It was suicidal, as if he was testing how far he could go.Jealousy may also be a motive.MacArthur had complained in December 1951 that he would not be able to hold North Korea without reinforcements; but after Ridgway took office, the troops did not receive additional replenishment, yet they managed to push forward, the same as MacArthur's November-December The contrast to the catastrophe wrought by the moon is so stark that even an untrained eye can see it.

Therefore, MacArthur began to slander Ridgway and his "tug of war".He told General Courtney Whitney: "As long as China's ability to wage war remains unaffected, killing Chinese in North Korea, no matter how many, will not stop Red China's aggression in Asia." It seems impossible to understand that Ridgway's strategy was to establish and hold a defensive front as the first step in negotiations to end the war.He ignored Washington's repeated statement that "the policy has been determined", but repeatedly asked "at the highest international level" to make a decision on how to proceed next.

On March 1951, 3, the day that Truman was deliberately vague about crossing the 15th Parallel in his statement to the press, MacArthur extended his criticism beyond his private circle.In a statement to Associated Press President Hugh Bailey, he criticized halting the Eighth Army's advance to the 8th parallel as compromising "our mission to unify Korea."Acheson commented: "He has been told over and over again that this is not his job."

Nine days later, MacArthur gave a new performance, which Acheson called "a major disruption to government action."The Eighth Army's successful advance and nearly reaching the 8th parallel convinced the government that it was an auspicious time for a new peace effort.The pre-war situation has actually been restored, and the Eighth Army is almost on par with the Chinese and North Koreans in strength, and the United Nations can now bargain on an equal footing.Truman argued: "It is time, even for their benefit, at least as much as ours, to stop fighting."

But what conditions should be put to the Chinese?The discussions involve two levels of issues: one is a public statement that the president can make, and the other is a secret consensus on what the United States will accept or can discuss in negotiations.Politically, the U.S. government expects the support of allies and neutrals for its peace efforts.Militarily, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that the improvement in the Eighth Army's situation since December 1950 would allow the United States to engage in tougher bargaining.But Robert Lovett, acting secretary of defense during George Marshall's temporary illness, didn't quite agree.He expressed "general agreement" in forwarding to Acheson the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum on "tougher bargaining," but added that Taiwan and Beijing's entry into the U.N. could also be considered It will be "suitable" in the solution conditions. (It will be recalled that in December, China insisted that the above issues be included in the negotiating agenda, but was rejected by the United States. Acheson did not object to including them as part of the negotiating agenda when the United Nations promoted peace talks a month later , although he made it clear that the United States would not agree to any of these points. In view of this, the Chinese rejected the UN peace talks package. The behavior of the Chinese convinced Acheson that Beijing was not ready to negotiate.)
On March 1951, 3, Acheson Marshall and the Joint Chiefs of Staff met to review the proposed draft public statement.They decided to inform MacArthur about the forthcoming presidential statement and to ask his comments.Truman, who was on vacation at the Little White House in Key West, Florida, approved of the announcement. On March 19, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a telegram to MacArthur:
The State Department is drafting a presidential statement, the gist of which is as follows: The United Nations has cleared most of south Korea of ​​the aggressors and is now ready to discuss the terms of a settlement of the Korean problem.The United Nations believes that further diplomatic efforts should be made to achieve reconciliation before the army advances north of the [-]th parallel.This will take time to judge the diplomatic response and wait for new negotiations to develop.Given that the [-]th parallel has no military significance, the State Department has asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff what authority you should have in order to obtain sufficient freedom of movement for the next few weeks to keep United Nations forces safe and in contact with the enemy.Hope you have suggestions.

MacArthur's call back on March 3 effectively ignored the Joint Chiefs' request for his advice.He again complained of restrictions on his forces "that make it impossible to sweep North Korea at all, or to make a considerable effort to do so."He said his existing order was well suited to the situation.

In the days that followed, State and Defense officials pored over the proposed presidential statement and reviewed it with envoys in Washington from countries that have troops in North Korea.The statement made no concessions, nor did it ignore the conditions that China had previously put forward as the norm of the talks, but it did offer some unbridled diplomatic rhetoric: "The coalition command is prepared to proceed with arrangements to end and ensure non-recurrence Combat . . . including the withdrawal of foreign troops from North Korea.” It also indirectly expressed its willingness to discuss issues raised by Beijing: “A quick solution to the North Korean question would greatly reduce international tension in the Far East and would open the way for the The established procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes to consider other issues in the region. . . . " Diplomatically speaking, these words were the first step in the perfect start for the negotiations.It did not make concessions in advance, but it did open up the possibility of concessions in actual negotiations.

Truman commented: "The intent of this statement is that a proposal, without any threat or condemnation, expressing our desire for a peaceful settlement, may be well received."

Three days later, while the State Department was discussing the draft statement with the governments of other countries, MacArthur himself issued an appeal to the enemy for peace talks, giving the president a bottom line. "If he meant it," said a study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "the United Nations commander simply couldn't find a more effective way to piss off the president."

Although MacArthur later pretended to be innocent and described his statement as a "routine communique", it was not the case.He was fully aware that, with the pride of the Chinese, they would interpret his "peace initiative" as an advocacy for the continuation of the war, not its end.MacArthur's statement was not sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review in advance, and without greeting the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it was stabbed to the press.

MacArthur believes that China's military power has been exaggerated.He said: "Even under the conditions that the activities of the United Nations forces are currently restricted, and the corresponding military superiority belongs to Red China, the facts still show that it is completely unable to complete the conquest of North Korea by force." (MacArthur in the past few years What he told the Joint Chiefs of Staff for months was another.) What he offered the Chinese was an ultimatum, not a negotiation:
The enemy ... must have painfully realized by now that if the United Nations decides to move away from its permissive practice of confining the war to North Korea and expand our military operations to its coastal areas and inland bases, then Red China is doomed There is an immediate danger of military collapse. ...

However, within my purview as a military commander, it goes without saying that I am ready to hold talks with the enemy commander-in-chief on the field at any time, and make a sincere effort to find any military means by which it will be possible to achieve the United Nations mission in Korea. political goals without further bloodshed.No country has any reason to object to this goal of the United Nations.

(End of this chapter)