The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 94 Mai Shuai dismissed (2)
As one might expect, MacArthur later denied any missteps.After he was removed from office, he answered questions at a Senate hearing: "The proclamation I have issued is nothing more than the kind that every field commander can issue at any time. Through this announcement, he can consult with the opposing commander-in-chief, Seek a way to end hostilities on both sides.” But didn’t he know about that State Department initiative that was about to be distributed to U.N. allies? "Yes, I received that telegram. But in any case, it has nothing to do with my statement... I see nothing unusual, heresy or inappropriate in the statement I made on March 3 The place."

In his testimony, MacArthur wasn't evasive -- he was lying outright.Later that year, speaking to a friendly gathering of the American Legion, MacArthur boasted that he had uncovered one of the "most disgraceful conspiracies" in American history.He saw Acheson's peace operation as a betrayal, a political move that would end the war without victory, with disastrous consequences for the United States and South Korea.In Adjutant Courtney Whitney's view, the Lovett memo, which discusses Taiwan's status and Beijing's seat at the United Nations, is evidence of "a sinister element at work ... a conspiracy that has penetrated the upper echelons of the government."Strange to say, however, the records show that MacArthur was not even informed of the shift at all until March 3, six days after MacArthur's announcement disrupted the peace initiative.Others who were loyal to MacArthur had their own "afterthought" explanation.General Willoughby made a less plausible argument that MacArthur was actually supplementing Washington's peace initiative with "smart psychological warfare" designed to "support the impending peace offensive within the United Nations."In his memoirs, MacArthur tried to describe his statement as a "military operation."He made the statement "in the authority of a commander" and expressed "the partial view of a theater commander."

Regardless of the reason, MacArthur's challenge is already too much.In the words of Secretary of Defense Marshall, his statement—

To create a very serious situation for our allies where they have no idea how we are going to do it: the President has something to bring to their attention and adjust their actions to act in unison.But this process was not yet complete, and the commander in the field made another proposal, which made the president's efforts to deal with the situation in vain.In particular, I think it has created a discredited government leadership.

In Truman's view, the question of who would run U.S. foreign policy was far more important than the diplomatic turmoil caused by MacArthur's "appeal" (the Norwegian ambassador's term for asking the State Department what the Americans were up to). "More importantly, General MacArthur once again defied the policy of the Commander-in-Chief, the President of the United States."

Telegrams concerning the Spaniards and Portuguese had made MacArthur's dismissal inevitable.And now, Harry Truman has a publicly available corroboration.

washington flew into a rage

On the evening of March 3, Washington time, Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett heard MacArthur's statement on peace talks and immediately came to Dean Rusk with Dean Rusk, Lucius Battelle and Alexis Johnson of the State Department. At Ann Acheson's house, the meeting lasted until 23 a.m. the next morning.Acheson said of the meeting with Lovett: "Robert, when he's under pressure, is usually witty and upbeat. . . but that night, he had no sense of humor. , The solution he proposed was that General MacArthur must be removed, and immediately." Acheson believed that Lovett's mood was a "moment of rage" and did not reflect the consistent thinking of the Pentagon. "I'm pretty sure that by the next morning, most of the anger will have dissipated."

In fact, Acheson himself was also very upset. He felt that the peace initiative could have prompted the Chinese to respond positively.Years later, he was still furious. He said: "MacArthur's nonsense, and what he issued... (in the statement) made it impossible for people to accept the proposal for negotiations." The allies of the United Nations believed that this situation was " An unbelievable situation. They don't know who is running the U.S. government. I don't think anyone doubts that this is a deliberate gimmick, but they have to have a reason to believe it."

MacArthur is still unwilling to be alone.At that time, his "peace" telegram was still being transmitted in Washington. It was surprising that he said at a press conference during a battlefield inspection that there were no adverse consequences for crossing the [-]th parallel; The Force has crossed it before and will cross it; the issue "was fully discussed and resolved in the past."Acheson called this statement "five thunders strike the top".

But how should governments respond?Truman's initial reaction seemed to be that he could not believe what had happened.He complained at a cabinet meeting that he had "a terrible experience dealing with MacArthur" who "was running ahead" before he was ready to make a statement.Truman said it was an "act of disloyalty to the Commander-in-Chief."

On March 3, Washington time, the day after MacArthur's "peace" statement, Truman met with Acheson, Lovett, and Rusk.The consensus was that he had violated the unequivocal order of December 24 last year banning foreign policy statements.The implication is that MacArthur has made himself subject to military justice, and he may have wished for it, because he has a high self-esteem and believes that he has the opportunity to make troubles in the city.A close friend of Truman said the president did not seriously consider the possibility of military justice against MacArthur.This person also said: "MacArthur has already tossed himself almost enough, there is no need to make him a martyr." Truman did decide to take a legal approach on March 12, that is, to give MacArthur a clear signal: President Think he is disobedient.At Acheson's suggestion, Truman ordered the Joint Chiefs of Staff to send the general a two-part telegram reminding him of the order of December 6 last year and directing that if the Communist leader "When a truce is requested on the battlefield, you should immediately report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and await orders". (In a Senate hearing later that spring, MacArthur claimed, implausibly, that he did not regard the cable as a "reprimand" to him, never to confuse it with his March 3 demand linked to the statement of the enemy's negotiations.)
Over the next few days, despite Truman's reminders, MacArthur continued to interfere with government policy.In a conversation with the "London Daily Telegraph" military reporter Lieutenant General Martin, MacArthur asserted that his troops were "chained in a man-made net" and that he "discovered for the first time in his military career that he was fighting a war." A war without a clear goal”; on the 6th parallel, it was politicians who violated the purview of the military. "If you don't talk about the lives of soldiers, this is very absurd." MacArthur implied that the monthly loss of 000 to 7 troops under his command was death and injury in vain. "If these losses, and even greater losses, are paid for a definite purpose (emphasis added), then we are ready to accept it." In another interview (this interview was earlier , published over the weekend, when the Truman administration was discussing what to do with MacArthur), MacArthur answered questions from The Freedman.The editor of the journal quoted a message that the South Korean government was dismissing recruits due to lack of equipment, and asked MacArthur why the US government did not provide equipment.MacArthur replied that the question "involves fundamental political decisions outside my purview."MacArthur was lying when he suggested on January 000th that the United States should not supply weapons to the "Korean Youth Army".

Republican senators picked up the subject of MacArthur.Homer Ferguson of Michigan suggested sending a congressional committee to Tokyo to ask MacArthur how the war should be conducted.James Duff of Pennsylvania said that "someone in power" should determine policy "and the rest should follow that policy".

In Truman's view, MacArthur's performance "has the characteristics of sensationalism."Truman's historic mind compared his relationship with MacArthur to that of Lincoln and General George McClellan during the American Civil War.McClellan had his own views on how the war should be fought, and if Lincoln gave him an order he didn't like, he ignored it.Like Lincoln, Truman got "upset just thinking about it" with the general and fired him.

The public trigger was a letter MacArthur wrote on March 3, four days before he destroyed the peace statement. On February 20, Congressman Joseph Martin, the Republican leader of the House of Representatives, said in a speech in the House of Representatives that he thought it would be "utterly stupid" not to use the Chinese Nationalist Army in North Korea.He sent the speech to MacArthur and asked him to comment. On April 2, Martin read MacArthur's reply in a speech to the House of Representatives:
Please send me your letter on 8th to forward your speech on February 2th, thank you very much.I read it with great interest.I see how many years have passed, but your sharpness has not diminished.

With regard to the situation created by the entry of Red China into Korea to fight our side, my views and suggestions have been elaborated and presented to Washington in great detail.In general, everyone knows and understands these opinions, because they just follow the traditional way of giving maximum retaliation to violence, which we have always done in the past.Your comments about using the Kuomintang troops in Taiwan are both logical and traditional.

Strange as it may seem, it is difficult for some to realize that the communists have chosen Asia as the place to set out to conquer the world, while we debate the resulting battlefield; that we are here with weapons Fighting for Europe, while diplomats are still wrangling tongues there.If we lose to communism in Asia, the fall of Europe is inevitable; if we win here, Europe is likely to avoid war and preserve freedom.As you pointed out, we have to win.We have no choice but to win.

Truman first heard MacArthur's letter when the wire service reported Martin's House speech.He read the manuscript with a rage.The second paragraph about the use of the Chinese Nationalists "in itself is sufficient to constitute a challenge to the current state policy" and is sufficient to dismiss MacArthur.MacArthur had been told clearly why the government could not use the Kuomintang, and he had endorsed the decision only eight months earlier.Later, when he changed his opinion and demanded the use of Kuomintang troops, he was told that the government's policy had been determined.Truman argued, "So, in praising Mr. Martin's logical and traditional position, he is actually saying that my policy is illogical and unconventional."

The president called the last paragraph of the letter "truly a terrific rant."This paragraph shows that MacArthur either did not understand or did not want to accept the determination of the United States to exist in Asia and Europe at the same time.Truman wrote sarcastically in his memoirs: "I don't know what intelligence channel the general used to learn that the Communists decided to concentrate their power in Asia, and more specifically in his jurisdiction." Truman was shocked. The most striking thing is that MacArthur ignored the efforts and sacrifices made "to contain the communist tide in Iran, Greece and Berlin". "Maybe he didn't know how vigorously the Kremlin was trying to prevent the emergence of a united front in Western Europe."Truman disliked MacArthur's "disparaging comments about our diplomatic efforts" and his rhetoric that "we have no choice but to win."

Truman's diary entry from that night is full of hatred of MacArthur - there is no other word to express this meaning. "MacArthur has made himself the center of controversy, both in public life and in his personal relationships." He went on to outline the general's private life: "He was always a controversial figure. He had two Wives—one was a socialite he married when he was 42, and the other was a Tennessee girl who he married after divorce when he was in his 50s." Truman almost put all the controversy on MacArthur.

The next day, the morning of Friday, April 4, Truman called Acheson, Marshall, Bradley, and Harriman into his office and asked them bluntly what they should do with MacArthur.In Truman's words, General Bradley was "extremely angry" and "both he and Avril Harriman said that I should immediately fire MacArthur."In fact, Harriman believed that Truman should have fired MacArthur two years earlier, in the spring of 6, when he was allegedly unable to return home for consultations due to his busy schedule in Tokyo.Harriman also recalls the time when Truman had to send Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royal to Tokyo to prevent MacArthur from supporting an economic bill in the Japanese Diet that was directly in conflict with occupation policy.

As for Acheson—

My own opinion on what should be done has been clear from the outset.I know very well that since the problem has arisen, it can only be solved by dismissing General MacArthur.But it's also clear to me that no matter what the president does, he deserves the unanimous support of all his military and civilian advisers.If he acts without support... there is a risk of bigger trouble than if he doesn't act.But... there must be a completely united front, and there must be no cracks in any case.

Marshall recommends proceeding with caution and thinking twice.He warned Truman that MacArthur's dismissal might make it more difficult to get military funding from Congress.

As for Bradley, the main consideration is military discipline.He believed that MacArthur's behavior was "a typical example of disobedience", and the general should be relieved of his command.But he thinks that it should be carefully considered, and it is best to consult with the Joint Chiefs of Staff before making recommendations.MacArthur enjoys great prestige among professional military officers, but the U.S. regular Army respects command more. If the Joint Chiefs of Staff approves the decision to dismiss MacArthur, it will weaken the reaction of MacArthur's supporters in the military.

Acheson, a former lawyer, summed up the discussion.He also believed that it was crucial that Truman had the unanimous support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.He didn't want the dismissal to look like a rash move by a high-spirited president.He told Truman: "If you fire MacArthur, it will be the most violent struggle of your presidency."

Truman told aides to "get together and have a good talk and come back with a report."In Truman's view, Martin's letter was not the main problem, and MacArthur's complete messing up of the peace initiative was "unforgivable."

This Friday afternoon, Marshall, Bradley, and Harriman met in Acheson's office.Marshall was nervous.In the military, it is well known that he is a person who does not appreciate MacArthur, but he does not want to come out and take the lead against MacArthur.He suggested that MacArthur be recalled in the name of consultations, and any final decision should be postponed until then.Acheson firmly opposed this opinion. "I see this as the road to disaster," he said.The Republican right used Senator Joseph McCarthy to lead the charge against the administration, and they proceeded to impeach the President in such a clumsy manner (leaked in a misplaced memo from Senator Wheely) that they convinced Acheson that "they were The fidelity of the constitutional process is at best superficial."MacArthur's playful ability made Acheson cautious. "Letting him return home when he has full powers, and his future has become a top priority, will not only damage the president's freedom of decision-making, but may also seriously endanger MacArthur's own future." Truman especially hoped that Marshall would stand by him, so in Marshall Before leaving, the president suggested that he read the telegrams between MacArthur and Washington since the beginning of the war.

(End of this chapter)