The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 95 Mai Shuai dismissed (3)
That night, Truman again commented on the general in his diary: "MacArthur dropped another political bomb through Joe Martin . Truman only glossed over the uproar over MacArthur's speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars last summer and his trip to Wake Island "to meet MacArthur and come to a face-to-face understanding."He went on to write: "I have come to the conclusion that our generals in the Far East must be recalled. (At the afternoon meeting,) I did not express any opinion, and did not inform them of the decision I had taken."

Over the weekend, the jaws tightened on MacArthur.At a meeting on Saturday, Marshall told the president that he had read the telegrams and concluded that "MacArthur should have been fired two years ago." Raeburn, Chief Justice Fred Vinson summoned to the White House.The two had been trusted friends of Truman, both political and personal, from his years in Congress. "We talked for a long time, and the Chief Justice advised caution," said Truman, "and he said that the authority of the President of the United States was at stake. . . . They said I must weigh the situation very carefully and draw my own conclusions. Rayburn The worry is political."

After they left, Truman took out his book on American history, and he read again about Lincoln's problem with General McClellan.One story that particularly amused him was how Lincoln dealt with McClellan when he was critical of politics.The story goes that Lincoln was asked how he would respond to the general. "Nothing, but this reminds me of a man whose horse kicked back and got his foot in the stirrup, and the man said to the horse, 'If you keep kicking, I'll kill you. Dismounted.'”

The brewing session took place Sunday afternoon in Gen. Omar Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in his Pentagon office across the Potomac from the White House.MacArthur was actually tried by a jury of his peers.

Ironically, the chiefs of staff had just decided to greatly expand MacArthur's powers and were awaiting the president's approval, and now they were discussing MacArthur's fate as commander-in-chief of the United Nations forces. On April 4, the day before Martin disclosed the MacArthur letter, the Joint Chiefs of Staff spent a day "as a matter of urgency" discussing the approach to the allies to determine their willingness to "support possible U.S. action against China." ".Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Sherman argued for a tougher draft, stating that "preparations must be made" to attack the continent rather than "continue to consider" such actions.In the official language of the Pentagon, Sherman's revision (already accepted by the other chiefs of staff) is that the Air Force and Navy should start massing manpower and equipment to attack specific targets.

Then, on April 4, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, responding to intelligence warnings of possible Soviet intervention, approved a draft order authorizing MacArthur to strike in "Manchuria" in the event of a major air attack on United Nations forces and the nearby Chinese air force base.In the next few days, the draft of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was approved by the secretaries of state, defense and Truman.According to normal procedures, the next step is to send the draft order to MacArthur for contingency planning, but the entanglement between MacArthur and Truman interfered with this process.The Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to withhold the order without even letting MacArthur know it existed.

In a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff explaining the decision, Bradley wrote the most damning words against MacArthur.The order was not sent to MacArthur, he said, because the Joint Chiefs of Staff feared that he would "rush to carry it out."

General Bradley was a little timid about dismissing MacArthur.Before Sunday's meeting, he suggested that Marshall write a private letter to MacArthur stating that his public statements had compelled the president to take action.Bradley and Marshall later drafted the letter to MacArthur together.

At 2 pm on Sunday, the chiefs of staff came to sit around the table in Bradley's office. They were Army Chief of Staff Collins, Navy Chief of Staff Sherman, and Air Force Chief of Staff Vandenberg.For the first time, they learned the extent of what Bradley called the "MacArthur problem."The president was considering replacing MacArthur, Bradley said, and Secretary Marshall wanted "strictly military advice" from the chiefs of staff.Although Truman didn't know it, the Joint Chiefs of Staff welcomed the opportunity to take on MacArthur.Colonel Chester Clifton, Bradley's adjutant, said the Joint Chiefs "had long ago—as early as February or January, and for military rather than political reasons, opposed MacArthur in everything. No illusions."Complaints from the Joint Chiefs of Staff related to: MacArthur's miscommands (split forces, and lack of intelligence in launching the November offensive); loss of confidence in himself and his troops; "high-tempered and blaming" telegrams to Washington; jealousy Li Qiwei's achievements in stabilizing the battle situation.Discussions that day focused on MacArthur's attacks on government policy, not his performance on the battlefield.

Discussions went on for about two hours.No official records were left of the meeting (the description here is based on Collins' memoirs and a memo by Sherman), but the chiefs of staff agreed from the outset that MacArthur must leave office.They also discussed a face-saving gesture that would allow him to retain his post as supreme commander in Japan, which the chiefs of staff knew was MacArthur's favorite position.But the problems of Japan and North Korea are so intricately intertwined that the theater cannot be led by two commanders.In the end, the chiefs of staff believed that MacArthur must be dismissed, and Matthew Ridgway was the best candidate for his successor.

At 4 o'clock the chiefs of staff (a "depressed but cool bunch," as Collins described it) descended into the hallway to Marshall's office.The setting here is one of Washington's great sights.Marshall sat behind a huge oak desk that had survived decades before when General John Pershing was in the War Department.The office windows looked out onto the verdant banks of the Potomac River on the Virginia side, beyond the White House, Capitol Hill, and the Washington Monument.This spectacle embraces those institutions to which a professional soldier must answer: the President, Congress, and the military tradition of George Washington.

Marshall has had the flu since the spring and he is still wheezing today.He sensed the impending verdict.In a sense, he will not welcome the ruling because it will inevitably be seen as an affront to the profession to which he has devoted his life.None of the chiefs of staff appreciated what was coming.Each of them was an officer, and was ashamed of the words "relieved from command."Collins said it well: "It's not an easy thing to be involved in removing a great fighter."

Marshall directly asked each chief of staff how to deal with MacArthur.Everyone said they were speaking "only from a military point of view" before making a statement, and no one wanted politics to get involved in the process.If the United States is to successfully limit conflict in Korea and avoid World War III, "we must have a commander we can trust and rely on," Sherman argued.Collins believed that the President "could well have had a field commander whose views were more in line with the fundamental policies of his administration and who was more able to submit to the will of the President as Commander-in-Chief."Vandenberg did not dispute.

They did not hold a formal vote.The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not propose that MacArthur should be fired, they simply expressed their views to Marshall for the White House.They opposed MacArthur for two reasons: the president (and themselves) needed subordinate commanders who could be completely trusted; and the principle that civilians were in charge of military power.Testifying before the Senate a few weeks later, Bradley outlined the thinking of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.Given that MacArthur "did not fully approve" of the government's policy in the Far East, "it would be difficult for him to carry out the established plan..." Bradley continued:

For the sake of military success, we have often insisted that whenever the superior completely loses confidence in a subordinate, whether or not the loss of trust is actually justified, that subordinate must also be replaced. ...

In the present example, there is not much evidence that MacArthur ever refused to carry out any direct orders from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or acted contrary to orders.But whenever MacArthur didn't get the orders he wanted, or he didn't agree with the basic policies that had to be followed, he made the problem public.Doing so sometimes gave away things that the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not intend to do, created considerable embarrassment, and created distrust of MacArthur's attitude toward future actions if they were not to his liking.This all creates public doubt, confusion, and uncertainty about the leadership of the military at a time when it is sorely needed.

The members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have at times expressed their firm belief that the military must remain under civilian control.In this incident, they were all very worried. If MacArthur was not dismissed, many people would criticize that the civilian government no longer controls the military.

The professional military pronounced a sentence tantamount to a guilty verdict, one of which was tantamount to the death penalty: General Douglas MacArthur should be removed from command and returned home.

the president makes a decision
The Oval Office is where the President of the United States does the heavy lifting.This extra-large room is located behind the West Wing of the White House, with ceiling-to-floor French doors facing the Rose Garden.The presidential desk is at the back of the U-shaped room.This office did not make Truman daunted.When he first occupied the room, he put a sign on his desk that read: "Unshirkable Responsibilities."

At 9 a.m. on Monday, this "responsibility" is the MacArthur problem.Bradley took the lead, reporting that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had agreed that MacArthur should be fired. (Bradley never expressed his opinion, and he was never asked about it. In a Senate hearing later in the spring, he said he had “not disapproved, but yes.”) Nowhere Hesitation.Marshall wanted MacArthur to step down; Acheson and Harriman were "very emphatic" that he should be removed; and before every adviser had spoken, Truman revealed that he had made up his mind.After seeing MacArthur's March 3 statement, Truman quickly decided that the general must be removed.

Discussion turned to the most effective way to tell MacArthur he was fired.Acheson believed that "it would be unwise to send the notification through military channels, which would let almost everyone in his command know that he was being fired without prior knowledge. This would be very important to General MacArthur. It's a shame. . . . "

As it happened, Army Secretary Frank Pace was visiting the Far East, and he happened to be in North Korea that day.Truman ordered that the notice of dismissal be sent to Pace, who would deliver it in person at 4 a.m. April 12 (10 p.m. Washington time April 4) at the home of MacArthur at the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo.There are two sets of messages involved here: one is a formal military movement order to MacArthur, Ridgway, and General James Van Fleet, who will succeed Ridgway as commander of Eighth Army; the other is White House Press Secretary Joseph Short Prepared public explanatory statement, once MacArthur was notified that he had been dismissed that public release.

(End of this chapter)