The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 99 The General Returns (3)
In the final days of April, two more issues remained unclear.Now that Republicans were MacArthur's de facto supporters, how far would they go in supporting the positions MacArthur advocated?Once the excitement and clamor dies down—American emotions come and go quickly—how much of the public will accept or understand what the General has to say?The duller Republicans apparently did not listen carefully to MacArthur's speech.Senator William Jenner, one of them, shouted gleefully that MacArthur opposed military aid to Europe.MacArthur certainly did not do this.Senator Robert Taft did understand MacArthur's two-continental strategy, declaring, "I have always endorsed General MacArthur's plan." Wants to break up NATO because it might spur the Russians to go to war.A few days after MacArthur's speech, Taft repeated one of his old tunes: "We must not overburden our country. . . . There must be a definite limited." But MacArthur once firmly said: "There are some people who claim that our strength is not enough to protect two fronts at the same time.... I think this is the most obvious manifestation of defeatism." Between the two The inconsistency did not publicly embarrass Taft, who continued to praise the general.The Republican Party has other inconsistencies.Republicans had yelled at Truman for sending troops to North Korea, but MacArthur's complaint was that Truman hadn't sent enough soldiers.When Senator Edward Martin of Pennsylvania vociferously objected to the "hasty midnight decision to order troops into North Korea," MacArthur said, "From a military point of view, that decision turned out to be justified."

But now that the Republican Party has accepted MacArthur, it has to mess with him now.He has an unmistakable use value—he can be used to embarrass the administration, and he can be used to help the Republicans strengthen their case that Truman was a lousy president who misused the likes of Acheson.But any Republican, as long as he soberly analyzes MacArthur's ideas and sees how incompatible MacArthur's proposals were with the opinions of the midwestern isolationists who were the mainstream in the Republican Party at that time, he will have good reasons to criticize them. Think again.

Public opinion is another matter.A Gallup poll conducted immediately after MacArthur's speech showed that 54 percent of the public approved of his proposals to blockade China's coast, bomb Red Chinese bases in "Manchuria," and help the KMT invade the mainland, but 34 percent opposed it.Only 30 percent wanted an all-out war with China, but a slim majority (46 percent to 38 percent) believed that Chiang Kai-shek's forces could defeat the Communists on the mainland if they received logistical support from the United States.Americans also believe, by a 6-to-1 majority, that the United States should defend Taiwan from Communist attacks.Looking at the polls, the first few rounds clearly belonged to MacArthur.

But there are weaknesses in his support.Just read his words carefully, and you will find that there are some confusing elements in them.MacArthur, for example, said that if the United States had followed his advice, the Soviets would "not necessarily" have entered the war.So, does the United States really want to risk an all-out war with Russia to resolve the Korean conflict?News reports in the first few days said that "the White House mail room was flooded with correspondence," most of which were angrily denouncing the president.Indeed, the written response from the public was harsh and initially opposed the removal of MacArthur in a 2-to-1 ratio (4 to 13 in the week ending April 8).But two weeks later, the mail was almost evenly tied (677 4 in favor, 322 10 against).As of May 448, the White House had received 10 letters, 617 in favor of the president and 5 against him.In other words, about 7% are in favor and 84% are against.But because people tend to write more when they are angry than when they are happy, the White House viewed the letter as reflecting a tie, or even a small advantage.

Moreover, both the White House and objective news observers agreed that hostile newspaper publishers fanned pro-MacArthur sentiment to discredit Truman.They did not condone him because he won the 1948 election despite the strong disapproval they had instilled in voters.Author James Michener, now in North Korea, called news coverage of the firing one of the "dirtiest days in American newspaper history," and blamed it on publishers who hated Truman.Michener said: "A radio reporter had to interview 17 soldiers before he could find one who agreed to have his voice heard, and the soldier asked pitifully, 'Why did they treat the general like this'. The other 1 What the soldiers said was actually better news, but no one needed it.” North Korean field commanders did not see MacArthur’s dismissal as a national catastrophe. Murray Schumacher of The New York Times reported from Eighth Army headquarters: "Among field officers, the general feeling is that relations between headquarters in Tokyo and the Eighth Army in North Korea will be more cordial.  … ..."

The White House rejoiced when opinion leaders such as the New York Herald-Tribune, a Republican paper, also supported Truman's right to win the support of his generals (or at least keep silent).Truman was going to base his reasoning on such insights.But the White House also recognizes that the Senate hearings in the coming weeks will be essentially a political wrestling, one in which MacArthur will use the platform to attack the administration's entire Asia policy, not just North Korea, and Republicans will use every Chance to embarrass the President.So the government set out to defend itself by employing the classic tactics that would become known, two generations later, as "hard-on-the-ball politics."

White House fights back
The White House's first public relations offensive against MacArthur involved the secret transcripts of the Wake Island meeting.At this meeting, the general declared bluntly that China would not interfere in the war.As noted earlier, these records are primarily the work of Vernes Anderson, the secretary of the State Department who traveled with Truman; notes taken by General Bradley and others were added to her account.Compiled copies of these records were sent to MacArthur headquarters in December 1950.The existence of these notes is no secret. On November 12, 1950, columnist Stuart Alsop wrote in the New York Herald Tribune that MacArthur had assured the President at Wake Island that the danger of Chinese interference had passed.When the little-known conservative publication The Freedman cabled MacArthur to confirm or deny the veracity of the report, it received this reply: "The statement (Althorp) quoted in the call . . . Unsubstantiated. MacArthur. Japan, Tokyo." MacArthur's denial of what he had actually said angered the government because it showed that he was willing to lie when it benefited him and that he thought he could do so without detection .The White House stood still, waiting for the right time to use the general's own words to give him a bottom line. On January 11, 13, columnist Drew Pearson published a short passage from his real notes, which included MacArthur boasting about Haikou, saying that if the Chinese crossed the Yalu River, his army could "take care" of the Chinese .

Shortly after MacArthur's dismissal, New York Times White House correspondent Anthony Livero began compiling the minutes of the Wake Island meeting into a complete version.One of the people Liverro came into contact with was George Elsey, a White House aide who had been gathering material to fight back against MacArthur.Liverro said he wanted to distinguish between conflicting versions of what MacArthur and Truman had said to each other.Elsie did not say anything to Liverro in their first conversation, but he mentioned the interview to Truman at a White House staff meeting the next morning.He also told Truman that Levero was "extremely anxious to see any written memorandum or record . . . of the Wake Island meeting."

"The president thought about it a little bit," Elsie said, "and asked if I had a copy in my file. I said yes, and the president said, 'OK, go tell Tony he can take it.'" Elsie said that day Just hand over the record to Leveiro. The New York Times published the report on April 4.MacArthur's camp was outraged, with General Courtney Whitney declaring that the White House was bent on "defaming" MacArthur by selectively leaking classified information.He also criticized "surreptitious note-taking" and questioned the accuracy of the patchwork transcript.Columnist George Sokolski saw the episode as evidence of the decline of public morality under Truman.Republicans on the Senate Joint Committee demanded all the documents on MacArthur from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the White House could not just provide some of the records and slip away.

When it began to fight back against MacArthur, the White House used some reliable officials in the bureaucracy to seek support, and tried to organize a broad front composed of citizen groups to support the government.Kenneth Heckler, coordinator of the White House team, sketched out a long list of things to do and things that had been done on a piece of White House Post-it.Both the State Department and the Defense Department prepared hostile questions for friendly senators to ask MacArthur.White House aide Theodore Tannenbaum is also trying to launch a congressional investigation into the foreign aid group.The China Aid Group was a loose coalition of conservative businessmen, congressmen, and religious leaders who spoke out in support of General MacArthur. "You'd definitely want to talk to the people in charge in Congress about how to get this going," Heckler suggested to White House lobbyist John Carroll.

The Democratic National Committee, through journalist Charles van der Vande, scooped up profiles of senators such as Taft, Wherry, and McCarthy to highlight their "back-and-forth" advocacy of sending troops to Asia and opposition to European defenses.The Democratic National Committee distributed tens of thousands of transcripts of Truman's speeches outlining administration policy.

Heckler recounts "trivial incidents concerning MacArthur material which may be useful should the debate reach the point of 'conspiracy'".Heckler writes, for example:

Vanderwand, assisted by Rep. Pat Sutton (D-Tennessee), is having the U.S. Army Signal Corps find photos of (MacArthur) wading ashore in Wright Gulf, Philippines.When you put the pictures together it's clear... that they were shot in quick succession in front of several newsreel cameras.On the side of the photo, many engineers and other maintenance personnel stand on a well-built pier without getting wet.I have my doubts about the usefulness of such materials, but am not opposed to collecting them.

At the Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, New York, material was searched against MacArthur in World War II.Another White House aide, Filio Nash, was allowed to work with "non-government agencies" who could participate in the fight against MacArthur.

In public, Truman spoke of MacArthur with contempt and derision.During a press conference on April 4, Truman deliberately provoked the defiant general.In his speech, he reminded reporters that, in a strict legal sense, MacArthur was still under his command.Five-star generals do not retire, they serve for life, so they are still under the command of the president.Truman said that, yes, he did "hold the rope" with MacArthur and General Whitney (he called Whitney "MacArthur's press secretary"), but he was not about to tighten the rope.The more MacArthur and Whitney talked at their secluded Waldorf-Astoria hotel, the more they did themselves a disservice, the president implied.When a reporter mentioned Whitney's claim that MacArthur "didn't understand at all" why he was fired, Truman burst out laughing. "Everyone knows why," Truman said, joining the roar of laughter.

generals are preparing
At the Pentagon, however, the atmosphere was far less convivial as the joint chiefs prepared for the hearing.The first step was to prepare a lengthy memo outlining every telegram exchange between MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs of Staff from June 1950, 6, when the war began, to April 25, 1951, when MacArthur was fired.Colonel Kress, who headed the staff, warned the chiefs of staff to prepare for "a personal attack on the integrity of the Joint Chiefs, both as an institution and as an individual."Kress believes that the questioning will come from three aspects: the strategy in the Pacific and various places; MacArthur's dismissal; "the timing and manner of his dismissal."Kress feared that any member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who testified with prepared statements or documents would trigger a surge in demands for official records, "which would jeopardize military security and impose serious consequences on current and planned actions have an adverse effect” and also affect relations with other countries. (Kress, apparently, was particularly worried about what would go on the record about the destruction of the South Korean military.) Accordingly, Kress advised the chiefs of staff to "get their heads down and testify at the hearings, as General MacArthur had already done. You don’t have to take notes with you.”The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed.Members of the Senate Joint Committee will receive a summary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's files on the Washington-Tokyo cables as background material, but the military high command will not bring any documents to the hearing.Marshall urged the Chiefs of Staff to "concentrate on how much we have to offer to the Joint Committee, and not on what we are not going to give. . . . " But he was less concerned with discussing plans and strategies for an ongoing war Doubt about one thing. "Can you say that," Marshall said, "by this time, I felt as if I was acting as an intelligence agent for the Soviet government and the Chinese government, and they gave me nothing."

(End of this chapter)